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INVESTORS BEWARE: ASSESSING SHAREHOLDER
DERIVATIVE LITIGATION IN INDIA AND CHINA
ANN M. SCARLETT*
ABSTRACT
In response to the 2008 financial crisis, the United States
government bailed out many business entities in exchange for
equity and debt interests in such entities. It also dramatically
increased the regulations imposed on businesses. This level of
government ownership and intervention in corporations is rare in
free-market capitalist systems such as the United States.
Government ownership and control, however, are common among
historically socialist countries such as India or communist
countries such as China. Yet, the United States’ recent actions
stand in stark contrast to the trend in India and China, which have
both been moving toward more capitalist systems by disentangling
government from business enterprises, reducing regulations and
government interventions, and allowing free markets to develop.
One specific example of such change in India and China is their
recent acceptance of the shareholder derivative device, which
empowers private investors to bring claims on behalf of a
corporation when it has been harmed by outside parties or, more
typically, by its own management. The shareholder derivative
device is widely recognized among developed countries. This
Article compares the nature of corporations and shareholder
derivative litigation in the United States, India, and China. It
specifically examines why India and China have embraced the
shareholder derivative device and analyzes whether the device
provides real protection for investors in Indian and Chinese
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corporations. Finally, this Article considers the lessons that
investors, corporations, and the United States should draw from
India and China’s recognition of shareholder derivative litigation.
1.

INTRODUCTION

The United States’ response to the financial crisis that struck in
2008 included interventions into private business entities. To
ameliorate the disruption to the financial markets, Congress
enacted sweeping legislation known as the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008,1 which included the well-known
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).2 As its name suggests,
TARP authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase
troubled assets from financial institutions caught in the turmoil of
the mortgage crisis and stock market collapse.3 As security for the
purchase of such troubled assets, TARP required that the Treasury
Department receive stock or debt interests in those institutions.4
TARP further entitled the Treasury Secretary to set corporate
governance standards for those financial institutions from which it
purchased troubled assets in exchange for equity or debt interests.5
The Treasury Department, however, never actually bought
troubled assets from financial institutions as directed by TARP.
Instead, it simply invested capital into financial institutions in
return for equity or debt interests.6 For example, the Treasury
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201–52 (2010).
Id. § 5211.
3 Id.
4 See id. § 5223 (requiring as a precondition to aiding troubled assets that the
Treasury Department receive warrants to purchase common or preferred stock,
or, if the institution’s securities are not publicly traded, requiring the Treasury
Department receive senior debt instruments).
5 See id. § 5221 (stating that “the Secretary shall require the financial
institution meet appropriate standards for . . . corporate governance”). Using that
power, the Treasury Secretary limited the executive compensation of participating
financial institutions’ senior executive officers. See Tarp Capital Purchase
Program, 31 C.F.R. §§ 30.2–30.3 (2009). The Treasury Department also forbade
golden parachutes for senior executive officers in such institutions. Id. §§ 30.8–
30.9.
6 See Testimony on the Troubled Assets Relief Program: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong.
3 (2009) (outlining a statement by Herbert M. Allison, Jr., Assistant Secretary for
Financial Stability, U.S. Department of the Treasury) (discussing certain treasury
programs enacted after the 2008 financial crisis). See also Press Release, Dep’t of
Treasury, HP-1338: Treasury Releases Guidelines for Targeted Investment
Program (Jan. 2, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press1
2
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Department invested $45 billion in Citigroup Inc. in return for
warrants to purchase its common shares, which resulted in the
government owning a 34% stake in Citigroup’s common shares.7
The Treasury Department has also twice bailed out American
International Group Inc. (AIG), an insurance company, which
ultimately resulted in the government’s 92% current ownership
stake.8
Perhaps more shockingly, the Treasury Department
ordered each of the nine largest financial institutions in the United
States to accept $125 million, which “most of them did not need or
want,” and then refused to allow these institutions to repay those
funds until it said they were ready to do so.9
In addition, two domestic automakers—General Motors Co.
and Chrysler Group LLC—and their affiliated financing entities
convinced the Secretary of the Treasury to extend $81 billion in
TARP funds to them and the Treasury Department again acquired
equity and debt interests in return.10 For example, the Treasury
Department invested $50 billion in General Motors as part of the
company’s bankruptcy reorganization, which resulted in the
government owning a 61% majority interest in 2009 and currently a
releases/Pages/hp1338.aspx (discussing the guidelines, justification, and
eligibility for the Targeted Investment Program).
7 See Tom Barkley, TARP Profit on Citigroup: $12.3 Billion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424052748703293204576
…MyQjAxMTAxMDEwOTExNDkyWj.html?mod=wsj_share_email_bot#printMo
de (noting the government’s profit from selling its warrants to buy Citigroup
stock).
8 See Serena Ng & Erik Holm, AIG Swings to Profit but Problems Persist, WALL
ST.
J.,
Feb.
25,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424052748703408604576164724143769978.html (detailing AIG’s proposed
stock offering and the impact it could have on the government’s “massive
investment in the insurer”); Serena Ng et al., AIG, U.S. Agree on an Exit Deal;
Making It Work Will Be Tougher, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704483004575523261932975260.h
tml (regarding the government’s sale of AIG shares).
9 See William M. Isaac, Was TARP Worth It?, FORBES, Oct. 1, 2010,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/billisaac/2010/10/01/was-tarp-worth-it/ (listing
the nine financial institutions that were forced to accept the funds: Citigroup,
JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, Bank of New
York/Mellon, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and State Street).
10 See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS: APRIL 20, 2010, at 114–16
(describing TARP aid to the auto industry); see also Josh Mitchell & Sharon Terlep,
U.S. Unlikely to Recoup GM Bailout, Panel Says, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2011, at B4 (“In
all, the government pumped about $81 billion into rescues of [General Motors and
Chrysler] and their affiliated credit arms . . . .”).
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33% stake.11 However, TARP’s express language mentions only
“financial institutions,” which it defines as a “bank, savings
association, credit union, security broker or dealer, or insurance
company.”12
Although these bailouts have been extensively criticized on
many grounds, the resulting government ownership interests in
private corporations are perhaps the most troubling aspects for the
United States’ free market system. When faced with a financial
crisis, officials in the United States government did not trust the
free market system to correct itself. Instead, the United States
government rushed in with public funds to rescue business entities
allegedly on the brink of disaster. In return, the government took
equity and debt interests in these business entities.
Such
government ownership of private corporations is rare in the
history of the United States.13 Many commentators argue that the
government’s bailouts give an unfair advantage to businesses that
have the clout to lobby for such handouts and thus threaten the
competitiveness of other businesses, particularly small ones.14
Similarly, other critics contend that these government
interventions undermine the functioning of the free market system,
because businesses are not held responsible for their bad decisions
by free market forces.15 Criticism has also been leveled at the
11 See Mitchell & Terlep, U.S. Unlikely to Recoup GM Bailout, supra note 10
(elaborating on the government’s dim prospects of recovering the money invested
in General Motors).
12 12 U.S.C. §§ 5202(5), 5211 (2010).
13 See, e.g., New Panama Canal Company Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-183, 32
Stat. 481 (1902) (detailing how the United States acquired the Panama Canal);
Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. § 831 et seq. (1933) (establishing
the Tennessee Valley Authority).
14 See Keith Naughton & Alison Fitzgerald, Ford Objects to Unfair Advantage
for
Bailed
Out
GMAC,
WASHINGTON EXAMINER,
June
8,
2009,
http://washingtonexaminer.com/business/2009/06/ford-objects-unfairadvantage-bailed-out-gmac (arguing Ford was placed at a huge competitive
disadvantage compared to General Motors and its financing arm GMAC because
the latter received government bailout money; Bloomberg data showed Ford
“paid $107.5 million more than GMAC for every $1 billion it borrowed”). Cf. Pete
Du Pont, Too Much Energy in the Executive, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703373404576148684150871602.h
tml (noting Health and Human Services Department has granted 733 businesses
waivers to the new health care law’s regulations).
15 See Luca Di Leo & Bradley Davis, Fed’s Hoenig: Easy Money and “Too Big to
Fail” Must End, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424052748703775704576162541139862146.html (stating that the bailouts
insulate institutions “from normal market forces that would otherwise force them
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government’s extensive creation of new regulations allegedly
designed to prevent further harmful conduct by businesses and
Wall Street, because these regulations have made a negative impact
on private corporations’ ability to compete.16 The more the
government intervenes in private corporations through ownership
interests or regulatory controls, the more fuel that is added to the
argument that the United States is edging away from capitalism.
These recent actions by the United States stand in stark contrast
to the trend among emerging economies, of which China and India
are among the largest.17 India and China are moving toward more
free market systems, such as that in the United States.18 India has
been liberalizing its prior socialist policies and adopting more
capitalist policies to foster private corporations and credit
markets.19 Similarly, China is shifting away from the state-owned
enterprises that dominated after the Chinese Communist Party
came to power in the 1940s to privately held businesses.20
One specific example of the changes occurring in India and
China is their recent acceptance of the shareholder derivative
to make more prudent choices”); Jeffrey Sparshott, TARP Inspector: Citi Remains
“Too Big to Fail,” WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424052748704307404576080193310619166.html (quoting Special Inspector
General for TARP as stating that “[u]nless and until institutions like Citigroup can
be left to suffer the full consequences of their own folly, the prospect of more
bailouts will potentially fuel more bad behavior”); see also Matt Cover, Free Market
Economists Reject Bailout as Bad Policy that Could Prolong Slowdown, CNS NEWS,
Sept. 30, 2008, http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/free-market-economistsreject-bailout-bad-policy-could-prolong-slowdown (criticizing the bailouts for
creating a system where “profits are privatized and losses are socialized”).
16 See Jared A. Favole, Business Group Frets Over Rules Review, WALL ST. J., Feb.
2,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424052748703960804576120503694195830.html (noting the Chamber of
Commerce views the Obama administration as enacting excessive regulations);
James Inhofe, O’s Quietest Jobs-Killing Machine, N.Y. POST, Oct. 4, 2010,
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/quietest_jobs_killin
g_machine_xAlRo2nRYjtYKaWKAwe7fN (stating U.S. Senator James Inhofe’s
opinion that excessive new regulations harm employment).
17 See World Economic Outlook Database, October 2010, INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.imf.org/external
/pubs/ft/weo/2010/02/weodata/download.aspx (listing China, India, Russia,
and Brazil as the emerging economies among the world’s twelve largest
economies by gross domestic product using U.S. dollars in 2009, with China first
and India third among the emerging economies).
18 See, e.g., SUBHASH CHANDRA JAIN, EMERGING ECONOMIES AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 384 (2006).
19 See infra Section 3.
20 See infra Section 4.
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device. In 2005, China enacted a statutory provision permitting
shareholder derivative litigation for the first time.21 India has
proposed legislation that would also recognize shareholder
derivative actions.22 Shareholder derivative litigation has long
been recognized within the United States and most other
developed countries,23 although the most frequent uses of such
litigation are in the United States.24 Shareholder derivative
litigation, however, is much maligned in the United States. Many
scholars advocate for the abolition of shareholder derivative
litigation in the United States,25 while others propose strict
limitations on such litigation.26 Shareholder derivative litigation
has even been criticized by courts27 and some state legislatures
have sought to curtail it through bond and pleading
requirements.28 In addition, some corporations may even attempt
See infra Section 4.2.2.
See infra Section 3.2.
23 See, e.g., Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability
Across Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1462–63 (2006) (assessing the legal risks
outside directs can expect to face in different countries, including the United
States).
24 See Mark J. Loewenstein, Stakeholder Protection in Germany and Japan, 76
TUL. L. REV. 1673, 1674 (2002) (claiming that directors of non-U.S. companies are
“less accountable to the interests of shareholders” than those of U.S. companies).
25 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 8.5,
at 404 (2002) (arguing that derivative litigation should be eliminated, or at least
discouraged); Tim Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the
Derivative Suit and the Shareholder Class Action, 98 DICK. L. REV. 355, 367–68 (1994)
(discussing that it may be unnecessary to abolish the derivative suit if aspects of
procedural law that create incentives for litigation abuse are reformed); Alan J.
Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, 43 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1629, 1682 (2002) (noting some principal-agent theorists have
suggested that derivative suits be abolished).
26 See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties:
A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 53–54 (1990) (arguing that
corporate rules should be determined by private contract and not by courts).
27 See Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (N.Y. 1996) (“By their very nature,
shareholder derivative actions infringe upon the managerial discretion of
corporate boards . . . . Consequently, we have historically been reluctant to permit
shareholder derivative lawsuits, noting that the power of courts to direct the
management of a corporation’s affairs should be ‘exercised with restraint.’”);
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (stating that “judges are
not business experts” and deferring to directors’ decision even though challenged
by shareholders).
28 See WRIGHT ET AL., 7C FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CIV. 2d § 1835
(2006) (listing Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin as states requiring shareholder derivative
plaintiffs to post a bond to cover defendants’ reasonable attorneys’ fees and
21
22

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss1/4

04 SCARLETT (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

10/30/2011 9:26 PM

INDIA AND CHINA DERIVATIVE ACTIONS

179

to escape shareholder derivative litigation by requiring that
Despite the criticism,
shareholder disputes be arbitrated.29
shareholder derivative litigation remains one of shareholders’ most
effective weapons against corporate mismanagement. Indeed, a
wave of shareholder derivative actions quickly followed the
mortgage crisis and financial meltdown in 2008.30
Recent events highlight that the United States may consciously
or unconsciously be edging away from its free market system,
while the clear trend in recent years in India and China moves
toward free market systems. This Article explores this seemingly
inverse trend through an examination of the shareholder
derivative device. Studying India and China’s acceptance of
shareholder derivative litigation demonstrates one way in which
these emerging economies are seeking to attract domestic and
foreign investors, and perhaps shows a means by which they seek
to better compete for capital with developed economies, such as
the United States. Empowering shareholders to sue derivatively
on behalf of corporations reflects China’s and India’s conscious
efforts to increase investors’ confidence in their corporate
governance and decrease government involvement in business
entities. It may also serve as a useful reference point for businesses
and governments within the United States as they consider the best
ways to compete in the ever-expanding global economy.
Section 2 of this Article explains the nature of corporations and
shareholder derivative litigation in the United States. Drawing
comparisons to the United States, Section 3 describes the evolution
of the corporate structure in India and its recent recognition of the
shareholder derivative device. Section 4 then does the same for
expenses); DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1 (2008) (requiring shareholder derivative plaintiffs
to file an affidavit swearing that they will not accept any compensation for
serving as a representative).
29 See Andrew J. Sockol, Comment, A Natural Evolution: Compulsory
Arbitration of Shareholder Derivative Suits in Publicly Traded Corporations, 77 TUL. L.
REV. 1095, 1108 (2003) (proposing arbitration as an alternative to judicial
resolution of derivative suits); see also Scott R. Haiber, The Economics of Arbitrating
Shareholder Derivative Actions, 4 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 85, 85 (1991) (noting securities
law disputes can be resolved through arbitration rather than litigation).
30 See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 2009 WL
4030869 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2009); In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig.,
2009 WL 2610746 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2009); In re American International Group,
Inc., 700 F. Supp. 2d 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (providing examples of shareholder
derivative actions following the financial crisis of 2008 and holding that some
such claims are predicated on fraud).
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China. In Section 5, the Article analyzes the meaning and likely
effect of India’s and China’s acceptance of shareholder derivative
litigation. It examines the reasons motivating India and China to
adopt the shareholder derivative device and the basis for the
specific forms chosen. In addition, given the existing legal systems
in China and India, the Article analyzes the likely effectiveness of
the shareholder derivative device either as a preventative measure
of ensuring good corporate governance or as a means to remedy
injuries suffered by corporations. It will argue that, while India
and China have adopted a shareholder derivative device that is
similar to the United States in theory, investors in Indian and
Chinese companies should be warned that the device will not
provide similar safeguards in practice. The Conclusion considers
the lessons that investors, corporations, and the United States
should draw from India’s and China’s adoption of shareholder
derivative devices.
2.

CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Unlike corporations in both India and China, which are created
under the authority of the central government, corporations in the
United States are creatures of state law and are incorporated under
the laws of a state, not the federal government.31 Each of the fifty
states have enacted statutes that govern the powers and operation
of the corporations incorporated under its laws.32 The states,
however, are not equals in corporate law. Delaware, the second
smallest state in the United States, is the well-recognized leader in
corporate law33 and is the leader in the state competition for

BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, § 1.2, at 5.
Id.
33 See Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann O’Hara, Corporations and the Market for
Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 661, 678–81 (2008) (explaining Delaware’s dominance in
corporate law by applying general market rules under which parties choose a
state of incorporation based on available laws); see also Renee M. Jones, Legitimacy
and Corporate Law: The Case for Regulatory Redundancy, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1273,
1287 n.46 (2009) (“A significant proportion of corporate regulation is handled at
the state level, with tiny Delaware being the dominant state in setting corporate
law rules.”); see also Omari Scott Simmons, Branding the Small Wonder: Delaware’s
Dominance and the Market for Corporate Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1129, 1171–75 (2008)
(describing Delaware as a leader in corporate law as a result of its experienced
judiciary, its business friendly reputation, and its substantial market share).
31
32
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corporate charters.34 A majority of states, however, have enacted
corporation statutes based on the Model Business Corporations Act
(MBCA),35 which was drafted by a committee of the American Bar
Association in 1950 and substantially revised in 1984.36
Despite the different origins of the various states’ corporate
laws, many of those laws are substantively similar.37 One key
distinction between Delaware and states adopting some version of
the MBCA is that Delaware created most of its law on shareholder
derivative litigation through common law development by its
courts, while the MBCA is a statutory enactment. Courts,
however, must still interpret and apply the MBCA’s statutory
requirements much as the Delaware courts must apply their prior
precedents. And, although the MBCA and other states’ corporate
laws differ in some respects from Delaware’s law, the Delaware
courts are commonly followed by other states on corporate law
matters.38 Delaware’s courts have gained such preeminence
because of the large number of corporate opinions they produce,
particularly the Delaware Chancery Court whose judges are
recognized as having business expertise. Thus, courts in other

34 See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1061–64 (2000) (arguing that Delaware’s
success in attracting corporate charters can be explained by the structure and
operation of its courts); Franita Tolson, The Boundaries of Litigating Unconscious
Discrimination: Firm–Based Remedies in Response to a Hostile Judiciary, 33 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 347, 403 (2008) (“Delaware is far and away the leader when it comes to
attracting corporate charters.”).
35 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN., at v, ix. (4th ed. 2008); see also Jones, supra
note 33, at 1294 (“Although Delaware is the leader among states in fashioning the
law and settling disputes on significant corporate matters, the [MBCA] also has a
significant influence on the development of corporate law standards throughout
the country.”).
36 See Mulder, Introduction to ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, at iii (1959).
The text of the Revised Model Act appears in MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. (4th ed.
2008).
37 See Fisch, supra note 34, at 1062 (“[V]ariations in state corporation laws are
minimal.”).
38 See, e.g., Mullen v. Academy Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 971, 973 n.3 (8th Cir.
1983) (“Although New Jersey law governs [this case], we discuss Delaware case
law as well, because of Delaware’s position as a leader in the field of corporate
law. The courts of other states commonly look to Delaware law . . . for aid in
fashioning rules of corporate law.”). See generally William H. Rehnquist, The
Prominence of the Delaware Court of Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture of
Providing Justice, 48 BUS. LAW. 351 (1992) (celebrating the significance of the
Delaware Court of Chancery’s contribution to the U.S. judicial system).
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states often “follow Delaware law as persuasive authority in many
decisions under their own statutes and common law.”39
2.1. Corporate Legal Structure in the United States
United States corporations have a single board of directors
elected by shareholders.40
The directors of United States
corporations usually include a combination of executive officers
(inside directors) and independent directors (outside directors).41
Independent directors currently comprise at least half the boards
for publicly traded corporations,42 although the ability of these
directors to effectively supervise management is doubted.43
State laws give the board of directors the authority to manage
the corporation.44 Shareholders elect the directors and thus, at least
in theory, they may hold those directors accountable for their

Jones, supra note 33, at 1287 n.46.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b), 212(b) (2009) (describing
regulations for meetings and votes of shareholders respectively); MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 8.03(c) (2008) (providing that directors are elected at annual
shareholders’ meetings unless the board is staggered).
41 See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 923 (1999) (defining
independent directors as outside directors without affiliations to the corporation).
42 Nicola Faith Sharpe, Rethinking Board Function in the Wake of the 2008
Financial Crisis, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 99, 109 (2010); Bhagat & Black, supra note 41, at
921 (“[T]oday, almost all [U.S. public corporations] have a majority of outside
directors and most have a majority of ‘independent’ directors.”); DAVID SKEEL,
ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND
WHERE THEY CAME FROM 183 (2005) (“Most large corporations already have a
majority of disinterested directors on their boards.”); NASDAQ, INC., STOCK
MARKET RULES § 5605(b)(1) (2009) (requiring that a majority of the board be
comprised of independent directors); NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §
303A.01 (2009) (same).
43 See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 42, at 184 (“All but two of Enron’s directors were
disinterested . . . yet the directors simply nodded their heads as [the CEO and
CFO] spun their web of magnificent promises and prophecies.”); Bhagat & Black,
supra note 41, at 922 (”Independent directors often turn out to be lapdogs rather
than watchdogs.”); Sharpe, supra note 42, at 109 (“Most corporations have boards
where a majority of directors are outsiders; however, these boards often are
composed of individuals who are not qualified to assess the strategic viability of
the corporations they direct.”).
44 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(A) (2009) (“The business and affairs of
every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2008) (“All corporate powers shall be
exercised by or under the authority of the board of directors of the corporation,
and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the
direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors . . . .”).
39
40
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decisions by electing new directors to the board.45 Other than
electing directors, shareholders possess little power; they cannot
initiate corporate action and vote only on dissolution, sales,
mergers, and amendments to the articles of incorporation and
corporate bylaws.46 If shareholders believe directors and officers
are mismanaging the corporation, failing to exercise proper
oversight, or acting in their self-interest, their only recourse, other
than selling their shares, may be to file a shareholder derivative
lawsuit.
2.2. Shareholder Derivative Litigation in the United States
Courts in the United States have long recognized the
shareholder derivative lawsuit, having imported the concept from
England.47 Shareholders may file a shareholder derivative action
on behalf of the corporation for an injury to the corporation.48
Typical shareholder derivative lawsuits include claims for
monetary damages based on corporate mismanagement, excessive
executive compensation, or corporate rights arising out of contract
or tort law.49 A shareholder may file a direct shareholder lawsuit
45 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b), 212(b) (2009) (describing
regulations for meetings and votes of shareholders respectively); MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 8.03(c) (2008) (providing that directors are elected at annual
shareholders’ meetings unless the board is staggered).
46 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 105–06 (2004) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Business
Judgment Rule] (explaining that shareholders have virtually no power to control
daily operations of a firm, to control long-term policies, or to initiate corporate
action); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 569–72 (2003) (discussing the weak
control rights of shareholders with the view that they are so weak that they
“scarcely qualify as part of corporate governance”).
47 See Nicholas Calcina Howson, When “Good” Corporate Governance Makes
“Bad” (Financial) Firms: The Global Crisis and the Limits of Private Law, 108 MICH. L.
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 44, 47 (2009) (noting that the shareholder derivative action
was imported into U.S. state law from England).
48 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a) (“This rule applies when one or more
shareholders or members of a corporation or an unincorporated association bring
a derivative action to enforce a right that the corporation or association may
properly assert but has failed to enforce.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.40(1) (2008)
(defining a “[d]erivative proceeding” as a civil suit in the corporation’s right);
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, § 8.2, at 362 (“[A] ‘derivative’ suit is one brought by the
shareholder on behalf of the corporation. The cause of action belongs to the
corporation as an entity and arises out of an injury done to the corporation as an
entity.”).
49 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, § 8.2, at 363.
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when the shareholder has suffered an injury directly affecting her
in her individual capacity, such as a claim of oppression by a
minority shareholder or claims regarding shareholder voting rights
or preemptive rights.50
Shareholder derivative litigation in the United States faces
many disincentives and hurdles. Only shareholders who meet
certain standing requirements may file derivative actions within
federal and state courts. To initiate or maintain a derivative action,
the plaintiff typically must have been a shareholder at the time of
the challenged transaction and the plaintiff must also be deemed to
fairly and adequately represent the interests of the corporation and
its shareholders.51 Several states require plaintiffs filing derivative
actions to post a bond in an amount sufficient to cover the
defendants’ reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses if the plaintiffs
own less than a prescribed amount of stock, measured either by
shares or dollars.52 A bond requirement is obviously a tremendous
financial disincentive to filing derivative actions. Even in the
absence of any bond requirement, shareholders often have little
financial incentive to initiate such litigation, because any monetary
recovery from a successful derivative lawsuit belongs to the
corporation.53 The shareholder thus at most benefits only to the
extent that the monetary recovery increases the value of their
percentage shareholding in the corporation. No financial incentive

50 Id. § 8.2, at 362–64 (contrasting direct shareholder suits from derivative
shareholder litigation).
51 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a) (“The derivative action may not be
maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent
the interests of shareholders or members who are similarly situated in enforcing
the right of the corporation . . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.41(2) (2008)
(requiring that a shareholder was an owner at the time of action complained and
“fairly and adequately represents the interests of the corporation”). But cf. DEL.
CH. CT. R. 23.1(a) & (b) (2009) (requiring that plaintiff was a shareholder during
the challenged transaction and requiring an affidavit disclaiming any form of
compensation from serving as the representative of shareholders).
52 WRIGHT ET AL., 7C FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CIV. 2d § 1835 (2006)
(listing Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin as states adopting security or bond for expense
requirements); see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-107-402(3) (2007) (allowing a court to
compel a shareholder who owns less than a prescribed amount of stock to post a
bond); N.Y. BUS. CORP. § 627 (same).
53 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, at § 8.2, at 362–63 (providing the example of
derivative shareholder litigation arising from a breach of contract in which the
corporation as a whole was hurt and therefore a remedy should benefit all
shareholders).
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may exist for shareholders contemplating a derivative action
seeking only injunctive relief.
In addition, shareholders who lose their derivative actions
must bear the expense of their own attorneys’ fees pursuant to the
so-called “American Rule” that parties to litigation pay their own
attorneys’ fees.54 Yet, unlike in many European countries, a losing
shareholder in the United States does not pay the defendants’
attorneys’ fees.55 Even if the derivative lawsuit is ultimately
successful, the shareholder-plaintiff must finance the litigation
until settlement or verdict occurs. This financial burden during
litigation, however, can be alleviated if the shareholder can find an
attorney willing to take the derivative lawsuit on a contingency
basis, which is permitted in the United States.56 When a derivative
lawsuit settles, which most do,57 the plaintiff’s attorney may
receive a sizeable fee from the fund created by the settlement upon
court approval.58 When the rare derivative lawsuit reaches a final
54 See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 241, 247
(1975) (holding that the Court cannot invade the legislature’s province by
redistributing litigation costs in a manner contrary to the “American Rule”); John
C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities
Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1, 6–7 (1999) [hereinafter Coffee, Privatization]
(“Under the standard ‘American Rule,’ each side bears its own legal fees (which
means that the plaintiff’s attorney faces only the loss of time and expenses
invested in the action if the action is unsuccessful and is not generally liable for
the winner’s legal expenses).”).
55 See, e.g., Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability
Across Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1406 (2006) (discussing the United
Kingdom’s loser pays rule as one of many deterrents to derivative litigation);
Franklin Gevurtz, Disney in a Comparative Light, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 453, 488 (2007)
(discussing Germany’s loser pays rule which places a significant financial risk on
a complaining shareholder who also recovers nothing personally if the suit is
successful).
56 See Coffee, Privatization, supra note 54, at 6 (noting that plaintiffs’ attorneys
may charge contingent fees in the United States, but that such fees are not
authorized in the United Kingdom).
57 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in
Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 9–10 (1985) [hereinafter Coffee,
Unfaithful] (noting that a majority of shareholder derivative lawsuits are resolved
through settlement); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without
Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 60 (1991) (finding settlement in about 65% of
resolved shareholder derivative lawsuits in a sample study from the late 1960s
through 1987).
58 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(c) (“A derivative action may be settled,
voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.”); Amy M.
Koopmann, A Necessary Gatekeeper: The Fiduciary Duties of the Lead Plaintiff in
Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 34 J. CORP. L. 895, 909 (2009) (“Whether a
shareholder derivative suit presents a valid claim or not, the plaintiffs’ lawyer
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verdict, courts have been quite willing to award the plaintiff’s
attorney their fees from the monetary recovery.59
A significant procedural hurdle for shareholder derivative
litigation in the United States is the demand requirement.
Generally, the board of directors controls the corporation’s
litigation, because the board possesses the statutory authority to
manage the corporation and its assets, which would include a
cause of action.60 In federal court and most state courts, a
shareholder is allowed to file a derivative action only after making
demand on the board to rectify the challenged transaction.61 In
may stand to receive a large fee from a settlement, even a settlement that brings
little or no benefit to the corporation.”); Mark J. Loewenstein, Shareholder
Derivative Litigation and Corporate Governance, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 2–3 (1999)
[hereinafter Loewenstein, Shareholder].
In recent years, however, the courts have . . . been willing to award
attorneys' fees to the plaintiff if the derivative litigation resulted in a
‘substantial or common benefit’ to the corporation, whether by judgment
or settlement. The courts have been quite willing, too willing perhaps, to
find a substantial benefit when the derivative action settles, the plaintiff
seeks attorneys' fees, and the defendant does not object.
Id.
59 See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970)
(recognizing that successful plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees in derivative
litigation because allowing “others to obtain full benefit from the plaintiff’s efforts
without contributing equally to the litigation expenses would be to enrich the
others unjustly at the plaintiff’s expense”); see also Loewenstein, Shareholder, supra
note 58, at 2 (“[C]ourts have been willing to award attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff if
the derivative litigation resulted in a ‘substantial or common benefit’ to the
corporation, whether by judgment or settlement.”).
60 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2008); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §
8.01(b) (2009).
61 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3).

The complaint must be verified and must . . . state with particularity . . .
(A) any effort by the plaintiff to obtain the desired action from the
directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the
shareholders or members; and (B) the reasons for not obtaining the
action or not making the effort.
Id. See also DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(a) (“The complaint shall also allege with
particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the
plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority and the reasons for
the plaintiff's failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.”); MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (2008).
No shareholder may commence a derivative proceeding until: (1) a
written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable
action; and (2) 90 days have expired from the date the demand was made
unless the shareholder has earlier been notified that the demand has
been rejected by the corporation or unless irreparable injury to the
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response to the shareholder’s demand, a board of directors may:
(1) choose to prosecute the litigation itself; (2) resolve the matter
through internal means; or (3) reject the demand.62 If the board
rejects the demand, which is the typical board response, the
shareholder must demonstrate to the court that the demand was
wrongfully rejected before being allowed to proceed with a
derivative action.63 In some states, the shareholder can forego
making demand and argue that demand is excused, which requires
a showing that demand would be futile.64
To establish that demand is futile or that demand was
wrongfully rejected by the board, the plaintiff must show that the
business judgment rule defense does not apply to the board’s
decision.65 As more fully explained below, this defense presumes
that directors acted consistent with their fiduciary duties of care,

corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of the 90-day
period.
Id.
62 See Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in
Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1349–1350 n.55
(1993) (“If corporate management believes the claims have merit, it may choose to
pursue corrective actions or take charge of the litigation. If management
disagrees with the shareholder's contentions, the demand requirement gives the
corporation the chance to reject the proposed action.”)
63 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, § 8.5, at 395; see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the
Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability,
42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 408 (2005) (noting “most boards” decide “not to bring any
action” and that “most courts defer to boards on this matter”).
64 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984) (stating that demand is
futile and thus excused when officers and directors are under influences that
impede their discretion to act on behalf of the corporation). The MBCA, however,
states a universal demand requirement. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (2008).
65 See Beneville v. York, 769 A.2d 80, 85 n.9 (Del. Ch. 2000).

[T]he Supreme Court’s emphasis on the business judgment rule supports
excusing demand in the case of an evenly divided board . . . . And in a
situation where a plaintiff shows that the business judgment rule is
inapplicable to a board decision, Aronson plainly states that “futility of
demand has been established by any objective or subjective standard.”
Id. (internal citations omitted). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1; BAINBRIDGE, supra note
25, at 395. Although plaintiffs argue that they cannot allege such facts with
particularity before discovery, courts typically state that plaintiffs already possess
the tools for gathering sufficient evidence. See, e.g., Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d
1207, 1216 n.11 (Del. 1996) (describing shareholders’ access to public sources, such
as the media and governmental agencies, and the right to inspect corporate
records); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2009) (stating shareholder’s
inspection right); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 16.02 (2008).
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loyalty, and good faith.66 To show the defense does not apply in
the demand context, the shareholder typically must show that a
majority of directors were financially interested in the challenged
decision or were not independent in making that decision.67 In
other words, a trial court will permit a shareholder derivative
lawsuit to proceed only when the board of directors is disabled by
some conflict of interest because in such circumstances the judge
may presume the directors will not sue themselves.
Even when a shareholder survives a motion to dismiss based
on the demand requirement, a special litigation committee (SLC)
composed of independent and disinterested directors may move to
dismiss the shareholder’s action based on its recommendation that
continuing the litigation is not in the best interests of the
corporation.68 Most courts find that the business judgment rule
defense protects the SLC’s decision69 and therefore grant the
motion to dismiss.70
66 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“It is a presumption
that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in
the best interests of the company.”); see also McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916–
17 (Del. 2000) (same; noting that the initial burden is on the shareholder to rebut
the presumption of the business judgment rule).
67 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814–15 (Del. 1984) (stating that the
court reviews the factual allegations to determine whether the issue involves an
“interested” director transaction, in which case the business judgment rule is
inapplicable to the board majority approving the transaction); see also Beneville v.
York, 769 A.2d 80, 85 n.9 (Del. Ch. 2000) (noting that in the case of a board with
only two directors, business judgment rule protection is unavailable because the
interested director can block the action of the impartial director). For the MBCA
provisions for overcoming demand, see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.44(c) (2008).
68 Douglas M. Branson, The Rule that Isn’t a Rule – the Business Judgment Rule,
36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 647–48 (2002) (explaining the procedure for establishing a
SLC includes amending the corporation’s bylaws to increase the number of
directors, appointing “expansion” directors, delegating to the SLC the board’s
power to deal with the pending action, hiring an independent law firm to conduct
an investigation, and preparing a report that may be filed with a motion for
summary judgment); see also Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of
Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 279 (1986) (noting a SLC may believe dismissal is
in the corporation’s best interest, because dismissal may raise the stock price).
69 In some states, the plaintiff bears the burden of rebutting the business
judgment rule presumption with respect to the SLC’s decision, and judicial
inquiry is limited to the disinterestedness and independence of the committee
members and the adequacy of their investigation. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett,
393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979); Finley v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 128,
132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Cutshall v. Barker, 733 N.E.2d 973, 978 (Ind. Ct. App.
2000); Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 884 (Minn. 2003). Other states
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Assuming plaintiffs survive these initial motions to dismiss, the
directors can again assert the business judgment rule defense in a
motion for summary judgment or at trial.71 The business judgment
rule defense is a common law principle that has been recognized
by courts in the United States for almost 200 years.72 An oftenstated rationale for the business judgment rule defense is to
provide the protection needed for directors to fulfill their
responsibility to manage the corporation without fear of
shareholders second-guessing their decisions through derivative
lawsuits.73 Thus, the rule allows directors to take calculated
business risks74 by protecting them from liability “for honest

also give business judgment rule protection to a SLC’s recommendation, but place
the burden of proof on the defendants. See, e.g., Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty
Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 378–79 (6th Cir. 1984); Lewis v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215, 225
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). In Delaware, the defendant also bears the burden of
proving the independence and good faith of the SLC, but the court may apply its
own business judgment in deciding whether to dismiss. Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787–89 (Del. 1981).
70 Fairfax, supra note 63, at 409 (noting that “in the vast majority of cases
courts grant the motion based on the [SLC’s] recommendation” (citing Carol B.
Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALI
Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1356–57 (1993)).
71 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 747 (Del. Ch.
2005) (stating that the business judgment rule applies in the absence of fraud, bad
faith, self-dealing, or acting in a way that cannot be attributed to a rational
business purpose by the directors).
72 See S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
93, 93 (1979) (discussing the idea that the business judgment rule is often
misunderstood, despite its long use in corporate law).
73 See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003)
(describing the balance between deference to board of directors’ decisions and
judicial review as the “defining tension” in corporate governance); A.L.I.,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01
cmt. d (1994); Arsht, supra note 72, at 95 (stating the business judgment rule
recognizes “the need to foster both business and judicial economy by not allowing
every corporate transaction to be subject to judicial review at the request of a
disagreeing shareholder”).
74 See Bainbridge, Business Judgment Rule, supra note 46, at 110 (referencing
the explanation advanced by the drafters of the American Law Institute’s
Principles of Corporate Governance that the rule protects directors from hindsight
reviews of decisions that would stifle innovation); Branson, supra note 68, at 637
(stating the business judgment rule is necessary to encourage directors to engage
in “informed risk taking that is essential to business success”); Len Costa, Boss of
the Bosses: Delaware’s Most Important Judge Takes on Greedy Executives, Congress, and
the History of Corporate Law, LEGAL AFFAIRS 43, 46 (July/Aug. 2005) (stating that
Delaware courts do not “second-guess decisions made by informed, disinterested
boards, for fear of chilling commerce and innovation”).
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mistakes of judgment or unpopular business decisions.”75 Other
justifications include that directors are “better-suited than courts to
make business decisions.”76
The Delaware Supreme Court articulates the business
judgment rule defense as a presumption that directors have acted
consistently with their fiduciary duties in making decisions for the
corporation.77 To rebut that presumption, plaintiffs must show a
breach of fiduciary duty78 or demonstrate fraud, illegality, or
waste.79 If the plaintiff cannot rebut the presumption, the business
75 Arsht, supra note 72, at 96; see also Bainbridge, Business Judgment Rule, supra
note 46, at 113–14 (“Business decisions . . . typically involve prudential judgments
among a number of plausible alternatives. Given the vagaries of business,
moreover, even carefully made choices among such alternatives may turn out
badly.”).
76 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); see also Branson,
supra note 68, at 637 (stating “courts are ill-equipped to review business
decisions” because they “often involve intangibles, intuitive insights or surmises
as to business matters such as competitive outlook, cost structure, and economic
and industry trends”); Fairfax, supra note 62, at 410 (stating that directors are
“better-suited than courts to make business decisions”). This judicial deference
for business decisions is difficult to justify, since courts willingly review decisions
of physicians and engineers. See Bainbridge, Business Judgment Rule, supra note 46,
at 120 (noting “no ‘medical judgment’ or ‘design judgment’ rule precludes judicial
review of malpractice or product liability cases”); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 94 (1991) (asking
why judges can decide whether engineers have properly designed jet engines but
not “whether a manager negligently failed to sack a subordinate who made
improvident loans”).
77 See, e.g., In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del.
2006) (describing due care determinations). To invoke the business judgment rule
defense, the board must make a decision, which includes a decision to act or a
conscious decision not to act. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984).
78 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 n.6 (Del. 1984) (citing Penn Mart
Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349, 351 (Del. Ch. 1972)) (describing directors’ duty
to inform themselves); see also McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916–17 (Del.
2000).

Procedurally, the initial burden is on the shareholder plaintiff to rebut
the presumption of the business judgment rule. To meet that burden, the
shareholder plaintiff must effectively provide evidence that the
defendant board of directors, in reaching its challenged decision,
breached any one of its “triad of fiduciary duties, loyalty, good faith or
due care.”
Id.
79 See, e.g., Paglin v. Saztec Int’l, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1184, 1200 (W.D. Mo. 1993)
(dealing with illegality and fraud); In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.,
906 A.2d 27, 73–74 (Del. 2006) (dealing with allegations of waste); Lewis v.
Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (same; defining waste as “a transfer
of corporate assets that serves no corporate purpose” or “for which no
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judgment rule defense protects the directors from liability for their
decision.80 On the other hand, if the plaintiff can rebut the business
judgment rule defense, the directors must then prove that the
challenged transaction was fair to the corporation.81 The MBCA
also contains much of the business judgment rule defense within
its standards of liability for directors.82 Judges invoke the business
judgment rule defense to protect boards of directors from legal
liability in the vast majority of shareholder derivative actions.83
Establishing a breach of fiduciary duty thus becomes an
important element in most shareholder derivative actions. The
fiduciary duties of directors are typically stated as a triad: care,
loyalty, and good faith. Delaware courts state that the duty of care
is breached when directors fail “to act in an informed and
deliberate manner” in making corporate decisions84 and that
directors are liable only if grossly negligent.85 The combined effect
consideration at all is received”); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1968) (considering the issue of fraud).
80 McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916–17 (Del. 2000) (describing the
business judgment rule attaching to protect director-defendants if the plaintiffshareholder fails to rebut the presumption provided by the rule); Citron v.
Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989) (same).
81 Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90–91 (Del. 2001) (“If the
presumption of the business judgment rule is rebutted, however, the burden shifts
to the director defendants to prove to the trier of fact that the challenged
transaction was ‘entirely fair’ to the shareholder plaintiff.”); see also In re The Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006) (same).
82 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31 cmt. (2008) (noting the MBCA “does not
codify the business judgment rule as a whole” but that “its principal elements . . .
are embedded in” § 8.31(a)(2)).
83 See Fairfax, supra note 63, at 409 (“[T]he tremendous deference courts grant
to board decisions means that courts hold directors liable for only the most
egregious examples of director misconduct.”); see also TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND
HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD 183–84 (2006) (noting “the
historical strong protection of corporate boards”); Coffee, Unfaithful, supra note 57,
at 9 (noting that the rare shareholder derivative lawsuits in which judges reach
the merits are overwhelmingly decided in the defendant’s favor by a ratio of
twenty to one).
84 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985); see also
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 369–70 (Del. 1993) (holding
directors violated their duty of care because they were not “adequately informed”
of all material information reasonably available before approving merger
agreement).
85 In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch.
2005) (explaining that business decisions are “actionable only if the directors’
actions are grossly negligent”); Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 1990 WL 42607,
at *12 (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 1990) (defining gross negligence as a “‘reckless indifference
to or a deliberate disregard of the whole body of stockholders’ or actions which
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of the focus on procedural due care and the gross negligence
standard is that Delaware courts rarely hold directors liable for
breaching their duty of care.86 Similarly, the MBCA states that
directors “shall discharge their duties with the care that a person in
a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar
circumstances,”87 but it only imposes liability if “the director did
not reasonably believe [the decision] to be in the best interests of
the corporation” or “the director was not informed to an extent the
director reasonably believed appropriate in the circumstances.”88
In addition, directors’ financial liability for breaching their duty of
care can be effectively eliminated, because all the states have now
enacted statutes allowing corporations to limit or eliminate
directors’ liability for duty of care breaches89 as well as to purchase
insurance to indemnify against such liability.90
According to Delaware courts, the duty of loyalty requires that
directors make decisions independently based on the merits of the

are ‘without the bounds of reason’” (quoting Allaun v. Consol. Oil Co., 147 A. 257,
261 (Del. Ch. 1929)).
86 See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 750 (Del. Ch.
2005) (“[D]uty of care violations are rarely found.”); see also Margaret M. Blair &
Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate
Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1790 (2001) (stating that courts “insulate directors
from liability whenever they make even a modest attempt to follow the
appropriate formalities”); Fairfax, supra note 63, at 407–08 (“Over the last twenty
years, a variety of mechanisms have contributed to a virtual elimination of legal
liability for directors who breach their duty of care under state law.”); Mark J.
Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of Corporate Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 353, 369
(2004) (“Van Gorkom is famous, of course, because it marked one of the few times
that a court found directors liable for breach of the duty of care.”); cf. Stuart R.
Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and
Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 591 n.1–2 (1983)
(noting only seven cases holding directors liable for all breaches of fiduciary duty
other than self-interested transactions).
87 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (2008).
88 Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(ii).
89 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2009) (permitting the certificate
of incorporation to eliminate or limit a director’s personal liability for monetary
damages for fiduciary duty breaches except for a breach of the duty of loyalty,
“acts or omissions not in good faith,” acts involving “intentional misconduct or a
knowing violation of law,” or “for any transaction from which the director
derived an improper personal benefit”); Fairfax, supra note 63, at 412 (describing
Rule 102(b)(7) as allowing a “corporation to limit or eliminate personal liability for
directors who breach their duty of care”).
90 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2009).
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transaction and that they be disinterested in its outcome.91
Directors are “interested” in the outcome of a transaction when
they “will receive a personal financial benefit from [it] that is not
equally shared by the stockholders.”92 Independence requires that
directors base their decisions “on the corporate merits of the
subject” and not personal considerations.93 Delaware courts,
however, rarely find a director to be controlled by another94 and
never find non-familial relationships to be bias producing.95
Similarly, the MBCA states the duty of loyalty as “a lack of
objectivity due to the director’s familial, financial or business
relationship with, or a lack of independence due to the director’s
domination or control by, another person having a material
interest in the challenged conduct.”96

91 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993) (“We have
generally defined a director as being independent only when the director's
decision is based entirely on the corporate merits of the transaction and is not
influenced by personal or extraneous considerations.”); see also Orman v.
Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 22 (Del. Ch. 2002) (stating the business judgment rule is
rebutted where a majority of the directors either were “interested in the outcome
of the transaction or lacked the independence to consider objectively whether the
transaction was in the best interest of its company and all of its shareholders”).
92 Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993) (Directorial interest also
exists where a corporate decision will have a materially detrimental impact on a
director, but not on the corporation and the stockholders.”).
93 Id.; see also Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 264–65 (Del. 2002)
(defining independence by focusing on whether the director has a familial
relationship with someone in the transaction or is controlled by another director
who is interested in the transaction).
94 Branson, supra note 68, at 640 (“Courts are loathe to find that an otherwise
reputable business person is not his or her own person.”); see also Beam v. Stewart,
845 A.2d 1040, 1052 (Del. 2004).

To create a reasonable doubt about an outside director’s independence, a
plaintiff must plead facts that would support the inference that because
of the nature of a relationship or additional circumstances other than the
interested director’s stock ownership or voting power, the non-interested
director would be more willing to risk his or her reputation than risk the
relationship with the interested director.
Id.
95 Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004) (“Allegations of mere
personal friendship or a mere outside business relationship, standing alone, are
insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about a director’s independence.”);
Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 980–81 (Del. Ch. 2000)
(finding allegation that a director was controlled by another director based on
their 15-year professional and personal relationship was insufficient to raise a
reasonable doubt as to independence).
96 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)(2)(iii) (2008).
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The duty of good faith is not viewed by Delaware courts as “an
independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as the
duties of care and loyalty.”97 The Delaware Supreme Court has
defined the duty of good faith by identifying two categories of
“bad faith” fiduciary conduct: (1) “subjective bad faith,” meaning
“fiduciary conduct motivated by an actual intent to do harm,”98
and (2) “intentional dereliction of duty [or] a conscious disregard
for one’s responsibilities.”99 The Court, however, has held that a
“failure to act in good faith may result in liability because the
requirement to act in good faith ‘is a subsidiary element’ . . . ‘of the
fundamental duty of loyalty.’”100 By contrast, the MBCA imposes
liability on director “action not in good faith.”101
3.

CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION IN INDIA

India has been greatly influenced by England. India was an
English colony from 1668 when the British East India Company
gained control of Bombay (now Mumbai)102 until 1947 when India
gained its independence from England.103 Thus, it is not surprising
that India’s legal system is based on the English legal system, just
as the U.S. legal system can be traced to England.104 In fact, some
of India’s current laws were codified during British rule.105 While
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64 (Del. 2006).
99 Id. at 66 (describing this second category as proscribing fiduciary conduct
that does not involve disloyalty but yet is more culpable than gross negligence).
100 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d at 369–70 (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d
492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)).
101 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)(2)(i) (2008) (“A director shall not be liable
to the corporation or its shareholders . . . unless the party asserting liability in a
proceeding establishes that . . . the challenged conduct consisted or was the result
of . . . action not in good faith . . . .”).
102 BARBARA A. FENELL, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH: A SOCIOLINGUISTIC APPROACH
241 (2001).
103 Afra Afsharipour, Corporate Governance Convergence: Lessons from the Indian
Experience, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 335, 348 (2009) (describing India’s recent
economic growth after difficult economic periods following independence in
1947).
104 Rajesh Chakrabarti, Corporate Governance in India – Evolution and Challenges
9 (Indian Sch. of Bus., Working Paper, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=649857 (describing India’s roots in the English
common law system).
105 See John Armour & Priya Lele, Law, Finance, and Politics: The Case of India,
43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 491, 499 (2009) (citing Indian Penal Code (1860); Indian
97
98
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an English colony, India had a capital market structure and
“inherited what was, at least formally, the best financial market in
the developing world.”106 India had four stock exchanges with
over 800 companies trading on them, including the Mumbai Stock
Exchange established in 1875.107 Not only did India have a large
capital market for an English colony, but it also had a “fairly welldeveloped . . . banking system.”108
After gaining independence from England, India turned
towards socialist ideas, and corporate governance radically
changed.109 Socialist planners had a set of core policies when they
revamped India’s laws: develop self-sufficiency by restricting
capital flow and imports, channel capital into large-scale “national
champion” firms, discriminate against large-scale private sector
firms in favor of small-scale firms, and foster development by
investing in education.110 During this socialist era, “the Indian
economy languished under what was referred to disparagingly as
the ‘Hindu rate of growth,’ averaging 3% per annum until the early
1980s.”111 This compares to a rate of 6% since liberalization began
in the mid-1980s.112
Since the mid-1980s, India has liberalized its economic policies
and transformed India’s capital markets into a prime destination
for global investment.113 India is now hailed as an “emerging
giant” and some researchers predict that India’s gross domestic
product (GDP) will “exceed that of all other major countries in the

Contract Act (1872); Indian Evidence Act (1872); Criminal Procedure Code (1873);
Negotiable Instruments Act (1881); Indian Trusts Act (1882); General Clauses Act
(1897); Indian Civil Procedure Code (1908) (“[M]any of [India’s] laws were in fact
codified during British rule.”).
106 Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 351.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 352.
109 See Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 14–15 (discussing India’s turn towards
socialism during the decades following independence); see also Armour & Lele,
supra note 105, at 499–500 (noting the socialist agenda implemented by India’s
post-independence government).
110 Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 496.
111 Id.; see also Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 341 (“During much of the postindependence period, India’s economy was saddled with socialist policies that led
to the slow growth rate often called the ’Hindu rate of growth.’”).
112 Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 496.
113 Shardul S. Shroff et al., An Overview of the Legal Regime Governing Capital
Markets in India and Current Developments, 1720 PLI/CORP 51, 55 (2009).
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world, including China” sometime between 2015 and 2020.114
Especially strong economic areas for India include pharmaceutical
and medical services, such as reading x-rays for patients, as well as
computer services.115 India has experienced dramatic changes in
its economic structure during the past decade, and its stock
markets hit record highs in January 2008.116 In 2007–2008, 124
companies made public offerings in the markets totaling almost
$18 million in U.S. dollars.117
Additionally, foreign investment in India has grown
exponentially. “Globally, India ranks as one of the most attractive
locations for foreign direct investment” and has “a promising
Net foreign direct
growth rate, second only to China.”118
investment into India amounted to $22.9 billion in U.S. dollars in
2007.119 Not only is India’s economy continuing to grow, but
foreign investors have reported success in doing business with
India. “About 66 to 75% of all companies involved in business
with India report as much success, or even better success than
expected.”120

ARVIND PANAGARIYA, INDIA: THE EMERGING GIANT 107 (2008).
See Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 349 (describing changes in “the
business of Indian companies” resulting from the need for capital, especially in
the pharmaceutical and computer services industries).
116 See id. at 355–56 (discussing reforms in corporate governance in India); see
also Franklin Allen et al., Financing Firms in India, USC FBE Finance Seminar, at 10,
Apr.
13,
2007,
available
at
http://www.usc.edu/schools/business
/FBE/seminars/papers/F_4-13-07_ALLEN-India.pdf
(noting
that
India’s
Mumbai Stock Exchange was the world’s sixteenth largest stock market in terms
of market capitalization at the end of 2005 and its National Stock Exchange was
eighteenth).
117 Shroff et al., supra note 113, at 56.
114
115

Furthermore, 36 companies raised reserves worth [$5.231 million in U.S.
dollars] through the qualified institutional placement . . . [of] external
commercial borrowings (‘ECBs’) amounting to [$22.165 million in U.S.
dollars] . . . . India’s external debt stock at end-March 2008 amounted to
[$221.2 billion in U.S. dollars], reflecting an increase of 30.4% over the
previous year.
Id.
Id. at 89–90.
Id.
120 Navneet S. Chugh, Doing Business in India 2009: Critical Legal Issues for U.S.
Companies, 1720 PLI/CORP 377, 381 (2009).
118
119
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3.1. Corporate Legal Structure in India
Prior to independence from England, India’s corporate law
derived from the 1850 Joint Stock Companies Act, which was
similar to England’s 1844 Joint Stock Companies Act.121 After
independence, India continued to base its laws on the English
system. Even during India’s socialist era, when England amended
its corporate laws, India followed suit by establishing a committee
to review its corporate laws.122 So, like English companies and
corporations in the United States, Indian corporations have a single
board appointed by the shareholders.123
3.1.1. India’s Corporate Legal Structure during Its Socialist Era
During the socialist era, India’s central government firmly
controlled corporate governance through various statutes. The
1947 Capital Issues Control Act forced private companies to get
government permission to issue new equity, and then the
government controlled the price of such equities.124 A later statute
prevented private companies in India from merging or acquiring
other companies to realize economies of scale.125 The government
also took control of securities trading and listing requirements for
the stock exchanges through the 1956 Securities Contract
Regulation Act.126 The 1956 Companies Act gave the central
government (exercised through the Department of Companies
Affairs’ Company Law Board or the Registrar of Companies) and
the judicial system power to regulate and oversee companies,127

Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 353.
See id. at 353 (“The Bhabha Committee, whose recommendations
ultimately formed the basis for the Companies Act, 1956, was convened partly in
response to the report of the United Kingdom’s Cohen Committee, which
recommended far-reaching changes to the English Companies Act, 1929.”
(internal citations omitted)).
123 Klaus J. Hopt and Patrick C. Leyens, Board Models in Europe – Recent
Developments of Internal Corporate Governance Structures in Germany, the United
Kingdom, France, and Italy, 1 ECFR 135, 150 (2004) (discussing the United
Kingdom’s one-tier board model).
124 Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 500, tbl.3 (discussing the 1947 Capital
Issues Control Act).
125 Id. (discussing the 1969 Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act).
126 Id. (discussing the 1956 Securities Contract (Regulation) Act).
127 Id. (discussing the 1956 Companies Act).
121
122
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including the protection of investors’ rights.128 The 1985 Sick
Industrial Companies Act created a state agency to take control of
firms with negative net assets.129 In addition, India “put in place a
regime and culture of licensing, protection and widespread redtape that bred corruption and stilted the growth of the corporate
sector.”130
During this period, India lacked strong and developed stock
markets. Three development finance institutions (DFIs), state
financial corporations, became the main providers of long-term
credit to companies. Through such lending, these entities acquired
large blocks of shares in the borrowing companies and their large
shareholdings entitled them to seats on the companies’ boards of
directors.131 Bank executives serving as board members, however,
had little incentive to properly appraise the companies’ activities or
management.132 At the same time, companies’ promoters managed
businesses with little equity investment of their own so promoters
often “bled the company with impunity, siphoning off funds with
the DFI nominee directors mute spectators in their boards.”133
Given this situation, as well as India’s slow bankruptcy process134
and weak creditors’ rights,135 banks often refused to lend except to
128 Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 14 (noting that the 1956 Companies Act and
other laws governed the functioning of joint stock companies and protected
investors’ rights).
129 Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 500, tbl.3 (discussing the 1985 Sick
Industrial Companies Act).
130 Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 15.
131 See id. (commenting that the board of directors were nominated by
organizations with the highest quantity rather than highest quality of lending).
132 See id. (discussing the nominated directors’ routine of “rubber-stamp[ing]”
for the management).
133 Id. at 16.
134 See id. (noting the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction’s two
year timeline to reach a decision); see also Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 500-01
(citing to one company’s fifty-year winding-up). When the board eroded the
company’s net worth, it would be considered “sick” under India’s bankruptcy
reorganization system created by the 1985 Sick Industrial Companies Act.
Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 16. The company would be referred to the Board
for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR). Id. Once registered with BIFR,
a company was protected from creditors’ claims for at least four years. Id. There
are some problems with the system, including: massive delays in the BIFR
reaching a decision, very few companies emerging successfully from BIFR, and a
legal process taking over ten years on average for companies that needed to be
liquidated. Id.
135 See Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 500 (highlighting that creditors had
few options other than filing a suit to recover unpaid debts).
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blue chip companies and instead invested in government
securities.136 Because financial institutions limited their activities
and boards were largely ineffective in monitoring management
during the socialist era, minority shareholders were often subject to
fraud.137
3.1.2. India’s Current Corporate Structure
After socialism failed, India began liberalizing its economy in
the mid-1980s.138 India’s decision to start liberalizing its economy
“is touted as a seminal event in India’s history, the moment when
it threw off the shackles of Fabian socialism and embraced free
Following a currency crisis in 1991,140 “the
markets.”139
government implemented a dramatic reconfiguration of India’s
economy. The motivating idea was to move decisively away from
state control by granting a significant role to the private sector,
encouraging
competition,
developing
market-oriented
mechanisms, and limiting government intervention.”141 Some
goals of corporate governance included increasing investor
protection and foreign investment by repealing socialist era laws
and by creating new laws to attract investors.142 Foreign investors
had not been allowed to invest in India’s companies during the
socialist era.143
Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 16.
Id. at 17 (discussing instances of both unintentional and deliberate
irregular share transfers and registrations that have negatively impacted minority
shareholders).
138 See Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 349 n.48 (“In the 1980s, the government
made some tentative moves towards economic liberalization, although most of the
government’s reform policies were piecemeal and uncoordinated.”).
139 Amit Varma, India’s Far from Free Markets, WALL ST. J. ASIA, June 16, 2005,
at A9.
140 See generally Valerie Cerra & Sweta Chama Saxena, What Caused the 1991
Currency Crisis in India?, 49 IMF STAFF PAPERS 395 (2002), available at
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/2002/03/pdf/cerra.pdf
(chronicling the devaluation of the rupee in the early 1990s and a subsequent
depletion of international reserves).
141 Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 501.
142 Id. at 501 (stating that the Capital Issues Control Act and the Sick
Industrial Companies Act were repealed, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act
was replaced with the Foreign Exchange Management Act, and the Securities
Contract Regulation Act and Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act were
amended to reduce government control of securities activities).
143 See id. at 503 (“Following liberalization, Indian stock markets have been
opened to investment by foreign institutional investors, overseas corporate
136
137
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One of the most important developments was the
establishment of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI)
in 1992, because it replaced central government control of the stock
exchanges.144 The SEBI is similar to the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission; it is an independent regulatory
administration and can issue binding regulations on the stock
exchanges.145 The government also built up its securities markets
by establishing the National Stock Exchange in 1992, the National
Securities Clearing Corporation Limited in 1995, and the National
These new and
Securities Depository Limited in 1996.146
independent institutions provided the necessary infrastructure for
India’s rapidly-growing stock markets and provided a sense of
security for foreign investors, who were newly permitted to invest
in India’s companies after the socialist era.147 Unfortunately,
companies currently face a “fragmented regulatory structure,”
because the SEBI and the Ministry of Company Affairs share
jurisdiction to regulate companies.148
While India has done much to revamp equity finance, it lacks
major reform in corporate debt leaving creditors without an
adequate remedy.149 To protect creditors, India established the
quasi-legal Debt Recovery Tribunal and passed the 2002
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security
Interest Act and the 2004 Enforcement of Security Interest and
bodies, and nonresident Indians, who have been allowed to invest extensively in
Indian companies.”).
144 See Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 18 (calling the establishment of the
Securities and Exchange Board “perhaps the single most important development
in the field of corporate governance and investor protection in India”).
145 Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 502 (“[The SEBI] proceeded to establish
a regulatory framework to ensure transparency of trading practices, speedy
settlement procedures, enforcement of prudential norms, and full disclosure for
investor protection, rather than the prior emphasis on government intervention
and control.”).
146 See id. at 503 (discussing the establishment of the National Stock Exchange,
the National Securities Clearing Corporation, and the National Securities
Depository Limited).
147 See id. (highlighting the increase in the number of market participants
since the opening of Indian stock markets to foreign investors); see also id. at 492
(stating that the regulatory agencies, instead of the legislative or judicial branches,
were the most effective method of producing improved legal rules).
148 Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 356.
149 Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 505 (discussing the limited application
of debt enforcement laws to banks and financial institutions; ordinary creditors
could still only recovery through civil courts).
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Recovery of Debts Laws (Amendment) Act.150 The effectiveness of
the new tribunal and these new laws, however, remains to be seen.
According to a 2007 World Bank report, “the completion of a
corporate bankruptcy in India still averages ten years—a tie with
Chad for the longest bankruptcy completion time in the world.”151
3.1.3. India’s Current Corporate Governance Laws—Article 49
In the early 1990s, India experienced a series of financial
scandals, such as the Harshad Mehta stock market scam of 1992.152
These scandals occurred after brokers purchased stock at
extraordinarily low prices, subsequently inflated prices, and then
sold the stock at the higher prices causing the stock market to
crash.153 A similar scandal in 2001 again caused the stock market to
crash.154 The brokers were able to arrange these deals with
financial institutions because, after the government’s control of
equities and the stock exchanges was relaxed in the post-socialist
era, the laws were too lax to avoid such deals.155 In addition, a
“vanishing companies scam” occurred in the 1990s when more
than 4,000 companies raised 54,000 crore rupees (more than $1.2
billion in today’s U.S. dollars) from investors and then vanished.156
150 Allen et al., supra note 116, at 8 (discussing the measures taken to protect
creditors’ rights since the beginning of liberalization in India).
151 Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 505 n.16; see also Country Profile of India,
WORLD BANK http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES
/SOUTHASIAEXT/INDIAEXTN/0,,menuPK:295589~pagePK:141159~piPK:1411
10~theSitePK:295584,00.html (last updated Jan. 14, 2011) (providing information
on the World Bank’s project in and research on India).
152 The scam allegedly defrauded an estimated 20 million people of $1.5
billion. Molly Moore, Panel Blasts Banks, Regulators in India Stock Scam, WASH.
POST, Dec. 22, 1993, at D3. Harshad Mehta reportedly gave the Indian Prime
Minister a suitcase full of cash so that he would overlook all the cash that banks
used to flood the Indian stock exchange. Id. Mehta, a government official, also
supposedly hindered the investigation. BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS,
Parliamentary Report on Securities Scandal Presented, Dec. 22, 1993, at pt. 3 Asia.
153 See Tania Mazumdar, Where the Traditional and Modern Collide: Indian
Corporate Governance Law, 16 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 243, 252 (2008) (describing
these “vanishing companies scams” and the need for more stringent corporate
governance reform).
154 See id. (noting that the Bombay Stock Exchange crashed by 147 points in
2001 due to stock broker scandals).
155 See id. (pointing to the SEBI’s ineffective oversight and inability to pursue
the fraudulent companies, merchants, and brokers).
156 Mazumdar, supra note 153, at 252 (discussing how these companies failed
to comply with India’s listing requirements). Rupee is the basic Indian monetary
unit.
See
generally
THE
CURRENCY
CONVERTER,
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Following these scandals, the Indian industry led the initial
efforts to instill public confidence in corporations and the securities
markets through changes in corporate governance.157 In 1998, the
Confederation of Indian Industry set up a voluntary code, called
the Desirable Corporate Governance Code, to protect small
investors, promote transparency, and take steps toward
international standards of disclosure.158 In the two years following
the creation of the Desirable Corporate Governance Code, twentyfive companies voluntarily adopted the code.159
While there were many proposals for changing corporate
governance, the SEBI developed a new provision that was based
on the Confederation of Indian Industry’s Desirable Corporate
Governance Code.160 The SEBI adopted Article 49 of the Listing
Agreement and the provisions went into effect between March
2001 and March 2003.161 Although Article 49 only applies to
companies that have more than 3 crore rupees (about $660,000 in
U.S. dollars) in capital at the time it issued its shares,162 researchers
described Article 49 as a “watershed event in Indian corporate
governance.”163 Similar to the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 enacted
http://coinmill.com/INR_USD.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2011) (providing the
conversion between the rupee and U.S. dollars, and that 1 crore equals 10 million
rupees).
157 Id. at 251; see also Sarita Mohanty, Sarbanes-Oxley: Can One Model Fit All?,
12 NEW. ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 4 (2006) (noting that Indian corporate
governance calls for transparency and accountability in decision-making).
158 CONFEDERATION OF INDIAN INDUS., DESIRABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A
CODE
(1998),
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents
/desirable_corporate_governance240902.pdf.
159 Mazumdar, supra note 153, at 252.
160 See Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 365–75 (discussing the proposed
government reforms and their associated implementation and enforcement
issues).
161 Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 19 (stating the three dates in which the
Listing Agreements were applied to various types of companies).
162 See
Dhammika Dharmapala & Vikramaditya Khanna, Corporate
Governance, Enforcement, and Firm Value: Evidence from India 2, 6 (U. Mich. L. &
Econ.,
Olin
Working
Paper
No.
08-005,
2011),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105732 (emphasizing that Clause 49 was not intended
to apply to all listed firms in India). See generally THE CURRENCY CONVERTER,
http://coinmill.com/INR_USD.html (last visited February 25, 2011) (providing
the conversion between the rupee and U.S. dollars, and that 1 crore equals 10
million rupees).
163 Bernard S. Black & Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Can Corporate Governance
Reforms Increase Firms Market Values? Event Study Evidence from India, 4 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 749, 757 (2007).
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by the United States after a series of corporate scandals,164 Article
49 imposes stricter standards on directors’ independence, requires
disclosure of directors’ compensation, and, for the first time in
India, imposes severe monetary penalties and threats of delistment
for public companies that do not follow its mandates.165 Although
Article 49 was perhaps inspired by reform efforts in the United
States and England, there is substantial debate on the convergence
of the Anglo-American model of corporate governance in India.166
It appears that “India’s political, economic, and social frameworks
have created a corporate governance environment that only
formally mirrors Anglo-American governance principles.”167
3.2. Shareholder Derivative Litigation in India
During the socialist era, shareholders could potentially bring a
lawsuit for oppression or mismanagement under the 1956
Companies Act.168 The 1956 Companies Act, however, was unclear
regarding whether shareholders could file derivative actions on
behalf of the corporation and other shareholders.
India’s
Parliament is currently in the process of enacting a new Companies
Bill that would more clearly allow shareholder derivative actions
and also permit shareholder class actions.169 The new Companies
164 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 sought to improve the accuracy and
reliability of corporate disclosures. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18
U.S.C.).
165 Mazumdar, supra note 153, at 253.
166 See generally Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 343–47 (discussing various
scholars’ views on the convergence debate in India).
167 Id. at 341.
168 See id. at 355 (observing that the Companies Act focused on cases of
oppression and mismanagement, not investor protection). See generally The
Companies Act, 1956, INDIA CODE, § 397 (1956), available at
http://indiacode.nic.in/fullact1.asp?tfnm=195601 (noting that oppression refers
to conducting the affairs of a company in a manner prejudicial to public interest or
interests of the company and its shareholders); id. § 398 (stating that
mismanagement occurs when the company’s affairs are conducted in a manner
prejudicial to the interests of the company or the public interest).
169 See Soo-Jeong Ahn et al., Asia / Pacific, 43 INT’L LAW. 1007, 1013–14 (2009)
(listing the intended goals and provisions of the 2008 Companies Bill). See
generally Indian Companies Bill 2009 Likely to be Enacted by Year End, ASIA PULSE,
Feb. 5, 2010 (quoting India’s Corporate Affairs Minister: the Companies Bill “will
seek to give shareholders, particularly the minority shareholders a voice and
balance the interests between the minority and majority shareholders”); Mohan R.
Lavi, Class-Action Suits in the Bill, BUS. LINE (HINDU), Nov. 26, 2009, at 9
(“Shareholder activism—not much prevalent in India save for a meek shout at an
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Bill updates the 1956 Companies Act.170
It was originally
introduced in Parliament during 2008, and the Parliamentary
Standing Committee on Finance successfully completed its
examination in August 2010.171 In 2011, the Ministry of Corporate
Affairs introduced the new Companies Bill in Parliament’s budget
session.172
At 260 pages, the new Companies Bill covers many different
aspects of corporate governance, shareholder protection, and
government oversight of companies.173 While not yet in force, the
new Companies Bill will provide for significant changes in Indian
corporate governance.174 The new Companies Bill “seeks to enable
the corporate sector in India to operate in a regulatory
environment of best international practice that fosters
entrepreneurship, investment and growth.”175 As stated by the
Ministry of Corporate Affairs, the new Companies Bill “is modern
in construction and provides flexibility to respond to the rapid
changes in the business environment while incorporating some of
the best practices in the field of corporate regulation.”176 It imposes
Annual General Meeting (AGM)—could gain traction with the Companies Bill
2009.”).
170 See Armour & Lele, supra note 105, at 501 (anticipating that the “entire
regime will be replaced by the enactment of the [new] Companies Bill”); see also
The Companies Bill 2009, Bill No. 5 of 2009 (India), available at
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/actsbills/pdf/Companies_Bill_2009_24Aug20
09.pdf [hereinafter India Companies Bill 2009].
171See Press Release, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Preparing for Indian
Corporates to Play Global, PRESS INFO. BUREAU, GOV’T OF INDIA (Dec. 24, 2009, 17:18
IST), http://www.pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=56471 (explaining that the
new Companies Bill originally introduced in Parliament during 2008 lapsed for
parliamentary reasons, and then it was re-introduced as Companies Bill 2009); see
also Press Release, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Promoting the Growth of the Indian
Corporate Sector Through Enlightened Regulations, PRESS INFO. BUREAU, GOV’T OF
INDIA (Dec. 23, 2010, 16:40 IST), http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=68664
[hereinafter Promoting] (stating that the Parliamentary Standing Committee on
Finance successfully completed its examination in August 2010).
172 Promoting, supra note 171.
173 See generally India Companies Bill 2009, supra note 170.
174 Timothy G. Massad, Current Developments in India’s Capital Markets:
Implications for U.S. Investors and Corporations, in CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE,
DOING BUISNESS IN INDIA 2009, at 33, 42 (2009) (highlighting the Companies Bill,
2008 and other recent reforms and developments in India).
175 Press Release, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Companies Bill, 2008
Introduced in Lok Sabha: Bill Intends to Modernize Structure for Corporate Regulation in
the Country, PRESS INFO. BUREAU, GOV’T OF INDIA (Oct. 23, 2008, 13:20 IST),
http://www.pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=44114.
176 Promoting, supra note 171.
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stricter corporate governance provisions, including disclosure and
accountability requirements as well as an independent director
requirement.177 In addition, India’s government has touted the
new Companies Bill as providing protection of minority
shareholder rights and enabling groups of shareholders to take
legal action.178 “The Bill reinforces shareholders democracy,
facilities e-Governance in company processes, recognizes the
liability of Boards . . . [and] provides for a new scheme for
penalties and punishment for non compliance or violation of the
law.”179
Under the new Companies Bill, shareholders may seek judicial
redress for oppression or mismanagement if “the affairs of the
company have been or are being conducted in a manner prejudicial
to public interest or in a manner prejudicial or oppressive to him or
any other member or members.”180 They may also apply for
redress if:
the material change, not being a change brought about by,
or in the interests of, any creditors, including debenture
holders or any class of shareholders of the company, has
taken place in the management or control of the company,
whether by an alteration in the Board of Directors, or
manager, or in the ownership of the company’s shares, or if
it has no share capital, in its membership, or in any other
manner whatsoever, and that by reason of such change, it is
likely that the affairs of the company will be conducted in a
manner prejudicial to its interests or its members or any
class of members . . . .181

177 See Indian Companies Bill 2009 Likely to be Enacted by Year End, supra note
169 (quoting India’s Corporate Affairs Minister: “India’s new Companies Bill with
stricter corporate governance norms is expected to be enacted by the end of this
year”).
178 See id. (“[T]he new legislation . . . will also protect the rights of the
minority shareholders, [and] bring about responsible self-regulation with
adequate disclosure and accountability . . . .”)
179 Press Release, Ministry of Corporate Affairs for the Gov’t of India, Bill
Intends to Modernize Structure for Corporate Regulation in the Country (Oct. 23,
2008), available at http://www.pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=44114. See
generally KMPG, COMPANIES BILL 2008 available at http://www.in.kpmg.com
/TL_Files/Pictures/CompaniesBill_08_p.pdf (containing a summary of the most
significant features of India’s 2008 Companies Bill).
180 India Companies Bill 2009, supra note 170, § 212(1)(a).
181 Id. § 212(1)(b).
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These provisions for oppression and change in shares within the
new Companies Bill resemble the United States’ formulations of
direct shareholder litigation.
The new Companies Bill resembles shareholder derivative
actions in the United States to the extent that it permits lawsuits for
mismanagement. This resemblance is solidified by the new
Companies Bill’s definitions of standards of conduct for directors,
including duties of care, loyalty, and good faith that are virtually
identical to the MBCA provisions adopted by a majority of states in
the United States:
(2) A director of a company shall act in good faith in order
to promote the objects of the company for the benefit of its
members as a whole, and in the best interest of the
company.
(3) A director of a company shall exercise his duties with
due and reasonable care, skill and diligence.
(4) A director of a company shall not involve in a situation
in which he may have a direct or indirect interest that
conflicts, or possibly may conflict, with the interest of the
company.
(5) A director of a company shall not achieve or attempt to
achieve any undue gain or advantage either to himself or to
his relatives, partners, or associates.182
The new Companies Bill further provides that directors
contravening these provisions “shall be punishable with fine which
shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to five
lakh rupees” ($2,200 to $11,000 in U.S. dollars).183 In addition, any
director who receives undue gains must pay those gains to the
company.184
Only certain shareholders in Indian corporations, however, will
have the ability to apply for a judicial remedy. When a company
has a share capital, at least one hundred members or one-tenth of
the total number of its members, whichever is less, or members
Id. § 147.
Id.
§ 147(7).
See
generally
THE CURRENCY CONVERTER,
http://coinmill.com/INR_USD.html (last visited February 25, 2011) (providing
the conversion between the rupee and U.S. dollars, and that 1 lakh rupee equals
100,000 rupees).
184 India Companies Bill 2009, supra note 170, § 147.
182
183
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holding at least one-tenth of the issued share capital may apply for
a judicial remedy.185 If a company does not have a share capital,
then the members must total at least one-fifth of the total
membership to seek redress.186 The new Companies Bill then states
that the Tribunal can waive these ownership requirements upon an
application by the shareholders.187 These ownership requirements
and the ability of the Tribunal to waive such requirements
resemble the bond provisions required by several U.S. states.
Those states impose an ownership requirement as a means of
waiving a bond requirement, but the new Companies Bill does not
require shareholders to post a bond as security for the defendants’
expenses. In addition, no court in the United States requires that
the plaintiff obtain consent to sue from the other shareholders,
whereas the new Companies Bill seems to require such consent
when it states that if one shareholder can make the required
ownership showing, it can get consent to sue on behalf of the other
shareholders.188
The remedies provided by India’s new Companies Bill appear
broader that those permitted in the United States. In addition to
interim orders,189 if the Tribunal thinks that the affairs have been
conducted in an unlawful manner and winding up the company
would hurt other members, it has a wide range of remedies:
regulate the company’s affairs in the future; allow the complaining
members’ shares to be purchased by the company or by other
members with a corresponding reduction in the company’s capital;
restrict transfers of company shares; and terminate or set aside
agreements between the company and a director if the Tribunal
finds it just and equitable.190 Further, the Tribunal has the power
to set aside any transfer, delivery of goods, payment, execution or
other act relating to the company’s property within three months
before the application.191 Similar to powers granted to the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Tribunal may remove
any director from office.192 The Tribunal, however, also has the
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192

Id. § 215(1)(a).
Id. § 215(1)(b).
Id. § 215(1).
Id. § 215(2).
Id. § 213(4).
Id. § 213(2)(a)–(f).
Id. § 213(2)(g).
Id. § 213(2)(h).
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power to appoint new directors, to dictate how new managers are
to be elected, and to impose any other equitable remedy.193 Finally,
the Tribunal may impose costs.194 This could mean that a winning
shareholder may be able to recover their litigation costs, just as can
a winning shareholder in the United States. However, this
provision could also be read to impose costs upon the losing party,
which would be contrary to the American Rule. It also is unclear
whether the term “costs” may include attorneys’ fees. This
uncertainty may deter shareholders from filing derivative lawsuits.
The new Companies Bill also permits a member or creditor to
seek a class action remedy if they believe that management is being
conducted in a manner prejudicial to the company, members, or
creditors’ interest.195 The class may seek an order on the following:
restrain an ultra vires act; restrain the company from committing
breach of its articles; void a resolution altering the articles; restrain
action on a resolution; restrain the company from doing any act
contrary to its provisions; or restrain the company from taking
action contrary to a passed resolution.196 Any such order is
binding and failure to comply is punishable with a fine for the
company between five lakh rupees and twenty-five lakh rupees
($11,000 to $55,000 in U.S. dollars).197 Every officer involved may
be punished by up to three years in prison or a fine between
twenty-five thousand rupees to one lakh rupees ($550 to $2,200 in
U.S. dollars), or both.198

Id. § 213(2)(i)–(l).
Id. § 213(2)(k).
195 Id. § 216.
196 Id. § 216(1)(a)–(f).
197 Id.
§ 216(2–3).
See generally THE CURRENCY CONVERTER,
http://coinmill.com/INR_USD.html (last visited February 25, 2011) (providing
the conversion between the rupee and U.S. dollars, and that 1 lakh rupee equals
100,000 rupees).
198
India Companies Bill 2009, supra note 170, § 216(3). See generally THE
CURRENCY CONVERTER, http://coinmill.com/INR_USD.html (last visited February
25, 2011) (providing the conversion between the rupee and U.S. dollars, and that 1
lakh rupee equals 100,000 rupees).
193
194
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CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION IN CHINA

In 1700, China had 23.1% of the world income.199 China
established the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 1905, and it was the
largest stock exchange in Asia until 1941.200 After the Chinese
Communist Party came to power in 1940s, creating the People’s
Republic of China (PRC), the country’s main economic goal
became creating a centrally planned economy.201 By the end of the
1950s, the government had taken control of all businesses and
closed the stock exchanges.202 Thus, corporations as they are
known in the United States disappeared.
In 1981, the PRC revived China’s securities activities.203 In
December 1990, the PRC reestablished the Shanghai Stock
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange to raise capital for
Chinese companies.204 By 2008, China’s stock markets were the
second largest in Asia after Japan.205 As of April 2009, there were
1,625 listed companies in China’s stock markets with a total
capitalization of RMB16.9 trillion (over $2.5 trillion in U.S.
199 JAIRAM RAMESH, MAKING SENSE OF CHINDIA: REFLECTIONS ON CHINA AND
INDIA 57 (2005).
200 See Chenxia Shi, Protecting Investors in China Through Multiple Regulatory
Mechanisms and Effective Enforcement, 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 451, 466–68 (2007)
(providing a brief history of China’s stock exchanges); see also Yuwa Wei, The
Development of the Securities Market and Regulations in China, 27 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 479, 488 (2005) (“Before the 1950s, China had the largest stock
market in Asia: the Shanghai Stock Exchange.”). For a chronology of the Shanghai
Stock Exchange through China’s history, see generally W.A. THOMAS, WESTERN
CAPITALISM IN CHINA: A HISTORY OF THE SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE (2001); see also
LI CHANGJIANG (李长江), ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG DE LISHI HE FAZHAN
(中国证券市场的历史与发展) [THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA’S SECURITY
MARKET] 3 (1998) (discussing the development of China’s stock exchanges).
201 Wei, supra note 200, at 488.
202 See id. (“[B]y the end of the 1950s, stock exchanges and securities markets,
together with all types of private ownership, were eliminated.”); see also Cindy A.
Schipani & Junhai Liu, Corporate Governance in China: Then and Now, 2002 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 66 (2002) (“When the new China was founded in 1949, business
corporations gradually disappeared. This was due to importation of the highly
centralized economy model from the former Soviet Union.”).
203 Wei, supra note 200, at 488 (citing ZHU SANZHU, SECURITIES REGULATION IN
CHINA 5 (2000)).
204 Xiao Huang, Shareholder Revolt: The Statutory Derivative Action in China
COMP. RES. IN L. & POL. ECON. (CLPE Research Paper 49/2009, Vol. 05, No. 09),
2009, at 4–5, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1516448.
205 Marlon A. Layton, Note, Is Private Securities Litigation Essential for the
Development of China’s Stock Markets?, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1948, 1963 (2008).
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dollars).206 One unusual aspect of Chinese capital markets is the
large number of small investors. Small investors, defined as
investors with less than RMB1 million (approximately $150,000 in
U.S. dollars) in cash or shares, account for 99% of the total number
of capital accounts.207 These shareholders tend to have relatively
short investing periods and trade frequently, resulting in an
average turnover rate that is seven times higher than rates in
mature markets.208 This high turnover rate has fueled a view that
China’s stock markets are casinos, rather than serious
investments.209
4.1. Corporate Legal Structure in China
To understand how the Chinese markets work, one must
understand the unusual corporate structures in China. China
currently has both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private
companies. These corporate structures have evolved over time.
4.1.1. China’s Historic Corporate Legal Structure
From 1950 to 1984, companies in China were organized as
traditional SOEs with the State wholly owning the SOEs and
exerting management control over them.210 The traditional model
206 Huang, supra note 204, at 5. RMB represents the China Yuan, renminbi or
“people’s currency.” RMB GUIDE, http://www.rmbguide.com/ (last visited
February 20, 2011). For the conversion of RMB to U.S. dollars, see Renminbi
Currency
Converter,
CHINABILITY,
http://www.chinability.com
/renminbiconverter.htm (last visited February 25, 2011).
207 Huang, supra note 204, at 5 (citing the figures of Shenzhen Stock Exchange
between January, 2007 and March, 2007, in: Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli
Weiyuanhui (中国证券监督管理委员会) [CHINA SEC. REGULATORY COMM’N],
ZHONGGUO ZIBEN SHICHANG FAZHAN BAOGAO (中国资本市场发展报告) [CHINA
CAPITAL MARKETS DEVELOPMENT REPORT], at 269 (2008)).
208 See id.
209 See Barry Livett, Securities Industry Faces Challenge, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 25,
2005 (describing the “pervasive ‘casino mentality’” of many investors); see also Xin
Zhiming, Stock Market Causes Heated Debate, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 13, 2001
(highlighting economist Wu Jinglian’s observation that rampant speculation
contributes to the casino-like qualities of the stock market). But cf. Li Xiang & Jiao
Xiaoyang, Rise of New Generation of Investors, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 18, 2010 (arguing
that an expanding group of young investors is becoming more sophisticated and
focusing on higher yields, rather than viewing the stock market as a casino for
quick profits).
210 Schipani & Liu, supra note 202, at 5 (“The traditional model of SOE
governance could also be referred to as the State-ownership model, or the Stateowned and managed model . . . . Not only did the State have ownership of all the
property of the SOEs, but it also enjoyed managerial powers.”).
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depressed private sector growth and deprived the country of
economic independence because it firmly bound the State, SOEs,
and employees to each other.211
From 1984 to 1993, the SOE form morphed from the traditional
model to the transitional model.212 The goal of the change was that
“SOEs should become legal persons that enjoy full management
authority and full responsibility for their own profits and
losses.”213 In 1988, China enacted the SOEs Law, which resulted in
three important changes: (1) allowed SOEs to be run on a day-today basis by the factory or company director; (2) provided for local
and central government supervision of the enterprise; and (3)
created democratic management, such as allowing trade unions.214
The 1988 SOEs Law decreased government intervention and
allowed enterprises to function semi-autonomously, but the
transitional model ultimately failed to provide the desired level of
reforms.215
4.1.2. China’s Current Corporate Legal Structure
In 1992, China’s late leader, Deng Xiaoping, called for a market
economy in China.216 The government’s goal became to “set up [a
modern corporate system] in the majority of backbone large and
medium-sized SOEs.”217 To achieve that goal, China enacted the
1993 Company Law, which provided the foundation for SOEs to
transform into state-owned corporations, closely held corporations,

Id. at 6, 8.
Id. at 8 (“The transitional model of SOE governance is also referred to as
the State-creditor’s rights model or the contracting model.”).
213 Id. at 8–9 (quoting a Chinese Communist Party Decision).
214 Id. at 9–10.
215 Id. at 11.
211
212

First, it was very difficult to identify a reasonable minimum amount of
profit for the SOEs to pay to the State. Second, although most SOEs
enjoyed benefits when they were profitable, they were unable to pay the
fixed amounts required to the State when they sustained losses. Third,
there was a fair amount of exploitation of the assets of SOEs for personal
use. Finally, too little SOE profits were retained for development
purposes, leaving insufficient resources for future expansion.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 12 (quoting 15th CPC Central Committee, Decision on SOEs Reform)
(internal footnote omitted).
216
217
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or publicly held corporations.218 The 1993 Company Law requires
corporations to have three governing bodies: (1) shareholders that
act as a body at the company’s general meeting; (2) a board of
directors; and (3) a board of supervisors.219 Although shareholders
act as a body at annual meetings of U.S. corporations, corporations
in the United States have only a single board of directors. This
two-tier board system is somewhat similar to the German system
with a board of directors and a supervisory board, except unlike in
the Germany system there is no hierarchy between the boards and
both boards are appointed by shareholders.220 As with most U.S.
corporations, Chinese companies must also have a chief executive
officer and a chair of the board of directors.221
SOEs continue to exist in China and are governed by the 1988
SOEs Law and the 1993 Company Law. SOEs must now meet the
following requirements: “(1) clearly establish ownership; (2)
provide well-defined rights and responsibilities; (3) separate the
enterprise from the government; and (4) employ principles of
scientific management.”222 SOEs may now have shareholders and
these shareholders receive rights that are similar to those possessed
by U.S. shareholders, including rights in proportion to the number
of shares they own, entitlement to dividends and to net assets if the
corporation is liquidated, and limited liability.223 While the goal of
modern SOEs is to promote separation between the government
and the enterprise, this has been difficult to fully achieve.224
Since implementing the 1993 Company Law, “China has
experienced an unprecedented wave of corporatization and
privatisation.”225 Approximately 80% of small and medium-sized

Id. at 13; Wei, supra note 200, at 492.
Schipani & Liu, supra note 202, at 14.
220 See id. at 15–16 (noting that in Germany the supervisory board oversees
the board of directors and that the members of the board of directors are
appointed by, and may be dismissed by, the supervisory board).
221 See id. at 14 (noting that these were two new statutory corporate
positions).
222 Id. at 22.
223 See id. at 22–23 (stating the rights that “shareholders of modern SOEs are
entitled to enjoy”).
224 See id. at 23–28 (noting that some SOEs are not holding shareholder
meetings, some have not established boards of directors, and the government is
still playing “decisive roles in fifty-two corporations”).
225 Wei, supra note 200, at 492.
218
219
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SOEs have become corporate entities.226 There are two types of
non-state-owned companies recognized by Chinese law: “closely
held corporations” and “publicly held corporations,” but these two
types have a variety of subcategories.227 There are different rules
on the corporate composition for these two main categories and
their corresponding subcategories.228 Both forms of corporations
are organized and controlled under the Company Law.229 While
China now has individual investors, two-thirds of outstanding
shares of most public corporations are still “non-tradable, stateowned shares.”230 In 2005, the government began non-tradable
share reform, but the reforms have not been as effective as hoped,
because only 28% of shares were tradable as of August 2008.231
China has passed laws and reformed the SOEs to introduce
private corporations and to allow SOEs to have private control.
These reforms give the appearance that the current structure of
SOEs is being supplanted by a corporate ownership structure
similar to U.S. corporations. The government, however, continues
to play a key role in Chinese corporations and the securities
markets, so the transition is not yet complete.
4.1.3. Corporate Governance in China
There are two commonly asserted concerns about China’s
corporate governance rules. One, China suffers from insider
control, which leads to “mismanagement and asset-stripping.”232
Not only do mismanagement and asset-stripping loot the
government due to its large corporate holdings, but they also
discourage private investment and results in a loss of capital.233
226 Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance,
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 125, 146–47 (2006).
227 Schipani & Liu, supra note 202, at 16.
228 See id. at 16–22 (describing some of the subcategories of each corporation
and briefly explaining the governing rules).
229 Clarke, supra note 226, at 146.
230 Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 5-6; see also Hui Huang, The Statutory
Derivative Action in China: Critical Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 4
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 227, 233 (2007) (noting that traditionally more than 60% of all
outstanding shares in listed companies were non-tradable, state-owned shares).
231 Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 6.
232 Clarke, supra note 226, at 147–148.
233 See id. at 148.

If management commits waste and fraud at the expense of shareholders,
this is obviously of direct concern to the state because of its large stake in
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Second, many Chinese corporations have majority shareholders
that dominate minority shareholders.234 A 2002 self-reporting
study by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and
the State Economic and Trade Commission showed that 40% of
companies completed related-party transactions with their ten
largest shareholders.235
To remedy these concerns, various governmental entities have
created a number of confusing and potentially conflicting
guidelines and requirements. Some Chinese regional governments
have passed corporate governance policy statements and guidance
documents calling for a specified number of independent directors
on each board.236 Similarly, central government agencies such as
the Ministry of Agriculture and the People’s Bank of China issued
guidelines requiring independent directors on corporate boards.237
In 2001, the CSRC issued the Guidance Opinion on the
Establishment of an Independent Director System in Listed
Companies, which called for independent directors for listed
companies.238 The CSRC has also issued guidelines on corporate
governance. For example, in 1997, the CSRC issued its “Guidelines
for the Articles of Association in Listed Companies,” requiring
listed companies to adopt provisions with the exact or similar
wording of the CSRC guidelines.239 In January 2002, the CSRC
released its “Corporate Governance Principles,” although its

the enterprises being looted. But it is also a government concern where
the state is not a significant shareholder because in addition to damaging
individual (and institutional) shareholders, mismanagement and assetstripping will, by discouraging investment in corporations, raise the cost
of capital in the economy generally and hinder growth.
Id.
234 See id. (stating complaints with respect to Chinese corporation’s
management).
235 Id. (“A related-party transaction is not, of course, necessarily a transaction
on unfair terms to the company, but given the lack of institutional safeguards that
might ensure fair terms, there are legitimate grounds for concern.”).
236 See id. at 178–80 (discussing various “regional government initiatives” and
reform efforts).
237 Id. at 180–81.
238 See id. at 128–29 (discussing China Securities Regulatory Comm’n, Guanyu
zai Shangshi Gongsi Jinali Duli Dongshi Zhidua de Zhidao Yijan [Guidance Opinion on
the Establishment of an Independent Director System in Listed Companies] § 1(1), issued
Aug. 16, 2001).
239 Id. at 183.
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provisions appear weak.240
While it is unclear whether
implementing the Corporate Governance Principles is mandatory,
companies that do not conform to them must disclose to what
extent their practices do not conform and the CSRC could pressure
companies to change their practices.241
4.2. Shareholder Derivative Litigation in China
As discussed above, when the Chinese Communist Party came
to power, the government took control of all businesses and they
became SOEs. The government owned and served as the ultimate
management for those enterprises. Shareholder litigation thus was
unnecessary because the only “shareholder” in SOEs was the
government.
4.2.1. Shareholder Litigation in China before 2005
China instituted various corporate governance reforms and a
shareholder protection system in its 1993 Company Law. The 1993
Company Law, however, only provided weak shareholder
remedies and did not directly address shareholder derivative
actions or directors’ fiduciary duties.242 In the 1993 Company Law,
Article 111 was the only provision granting shareholders the right
to bring a legal action:
If a resolution adopted by the shareholders’ general
committee or the board of directors violates the relevant
national statutes or administrative regulations, or infringes
rights and interests of shareholders, a shareholder is

240 See id. at 184. (noting that the provisions relating to independent directors
are weak because they do not require independent directors, providing instead
only that the company may establish independent directors in accordance with its
needs; nor do the provisions “say what the point of having such independent
directors might be”).
241 Id. at 186, 188–89. Among other things, the Principles require companies
to establish an independent director system, but the Principles do not provide
clear rules on how many independent directors should be on the company’s
board. Id. at 188–89.
242 Id.; see also Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 6–7 (“The Company Law 1993
barely played any role in preventing misconduct by the controlling shareholders
and directors and in protecting minority shareholders.”).
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entitled to bring a suit to the People’s Court to enjoin such
illegal act or infringing act.243
Article 111 failed to explicitly allow shareholder derivate
lawsuits and judicial decisions on Article 111 created complex
procedures for shareholders to bring a lawsuit.244
Even if Article 111 allowed derivative lawsuits, the only
available remedy was an injunction, not compensation.245 In
addition, if a shareholder wished to sue, the defendants and the
harm (infringement on shareholder rights) provided by the 1993
Law “were excessively narrow.”246 Despite these limitations,
shareholders and company representatives did attempt to bring
lawsuits under Article 111, but the lawsuits never reached a
judicial decision.247 For example, an investor sued the directors of
Sanjiu Medical & Pharmaceutical Co., but the court dismissed the
lawsuit finding that “the legal interests of the shareholders as a
whole” should be represented in a shareholder derivative action,
and thus the investor needed consent from all shareholders before
suing.248
Before the 2005 Company Law, shareholders lacked a clear
provision to sue a company when its directors or officers
committed a scandal.249 Thus, directors and officers committed
many corporate scandals without any consequence “[e]xcept for a
public criticism by the CSRC.”250 For example, during the 1996 to
243

(1993)).

Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 7 (quoting the Company Law, Article 111

244 See Jiong Deng, Note, Building an Investor-Friendly Shareholder Derivative
Lawsuit System in China, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 347, 356 (2005) (explaining that Article
111 provides for direct actions, but it is not clear that it provides for shareholder
derivative actions); see also Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 7 (stating that Article
111 “was vague and obscure . . . since there was no regulation regarding the
applicable procedures”).
245 See Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 7 (noting that the only shareholder
remedy was an injunction and “compensations might not be granted”).
246 Id.
247 See Deng, supra note 244, at 365, 372 (highlighting difficulties encountered
in the course of shareholder derivative litigation).
248 Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 11.
249 See Guanghua Yu, Towards an Institutional Competition Model of Comparative
Corporate Governance Studies, 6 J. CHINESE & COMP. L. 31, 42–43 (2003) (describing
the difficulty individual shareholders encountered in attempting to sue
companies because of the “[l]ack of clear provisions on derivative actions by
shareholders”).
250 Id. at 42.
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1998 time period, the Shanghai Jiabao Industrial Group Co.
“engaged in illegal speculative trading of shares in other
companies.”251 The Company used “more than 300 individual
accounts to circumvent” a government ban on trading and
introduced RMB228 million (about $34 million in U.S. dollars) in
primary and secondary markets through its activities.252 After an
investigation, the CSRC imposed a minimal administrative fine on
the chairman (RMB50,000 or about $7,500 in U.S. dollars), seized
the company’s small trading gains (RMB840,000 or just over
$125,000 in U.S. dollars), and “publicly criticised the [company’s]
directors.”253 In 2001, a controlling shareholder of the Sanjiu
Medical & Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd inappropriately used RMB2.5
billion of company funds (about $380 million in U.S. dollars),
which constituted 96% of the company’s net assets.254 The board of
directors did not approve the use of the funds by the controlling
shareholder.255 The CSRC publicly criticized the company, but no
other action was brought against the controlling shareholder
because of the lack of clear provisions on shareholder derivative
lawsuits at the time.256 The list of corporate scandals goes on.257
In 2003, however, the shareholder derivative action was
introduced to China through its courts. The Shanghai People’s
Court issued its Opinion on Some Issues in Trials for Legal Actions
Related to Company Dispute (No. 1) in 2003, setting up the first rules
for derivative actions.258 Shortly afterwards, the Jiangsu High
People’s Court issued its Opinion on Some Issues in Trials for Legal
Actions Applied with Company Law (Provisional Rules), which “set up
Id. at 43.
Id. For the conversion of RMB to U.S. dollars, see Real Time Renminbi
(Chinese yuan) Currency Converter, CHINABILITY, http://www.chinability.com
/renminbiconverter.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2011).
253 Yu, supra note 249, at 43.
254 See id. at 42 (detailing the CSRC’s investigation of a controlling
shareholder’s allegedly improper actions and the minimal consequences he
faced).
255 See id. (mentioning that both Sanjiu’s board of directors and supervisory
board had not approved the controlling shareholder’s actions “for a connected
transaction”).
256 See id. at 42–43 (attributing the absence of any further actions to the “lack
of clear provisions on derivative actions by shareholders”).
257 See id. at 40–47 (exploring and listing multiple incidents of questionable
corporate activities in China).
258 See Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 12 (citing this as the opinion in which
the “derivative action was introduced to China”).
251
252

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011

04 SCARLETT (DO NOT DELETE)

218

10/30/2011 9:26 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 33:1

the rules for shareholder representative actions.”259 In 2003, the
Supreme People’s Court also “published the first draft of
Regulations on Some Issues Concerning Trials for Company Dispute (No
1),” and allowed for public comment.260 This laid the foundation
for the changes in shareholder protections within the 2005
Company Law.
4.2.2. Shareholder Derivative Litigation in China after 2005
After experiencing corporate scandals and realizing the need
for stronger shareholder protection, China enacted the 2005
Company Law, which included a provision expressly allowing
shareholder derivative litigation. The CSRC adopted new policies
in the 2005 Company Law based on the theory that a correlation
exists “between capital market development and shareholder
protection.”261 In order to increase capital in the Chinese markets,
CSRC thus agreed to increase shareholder protections in the 2005
Company Law.262 Meilun Shi, former CSRC vice chairman, noted
the importance of strong shareholder protection in order for the
markets to function: “[I]nvestors’ confidence and participation are
critical to the healthy and stable development of China’s capital
markets.
They have a direct impact on the successful
implementation of reform and the Open-Door Policy, as well as on
social solidarity.”263 In 2000, the then-current CSRC chairperson
stated that investor protection was the top priority for the CSRC.264
Additionally, authorities were concerned about protecting
minority shareholders. Given the high percentage of state-owned
shares, minority shareholders were relatively “powerless” before
Id.
Id. For a discussion of the Supreme People’s Court regulations prior to
2005, see id. at 12.
261 Id. at 5. For the 2005 Company Law, see Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Gongsi Fa (中华人民共和国公司法) [Co. Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, revised
Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), art. 152 (Isinolaw) (China) [hereinafter
Chinese 2005 Company Law].
262 See Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 5–6 (describing the focus on investor
protection as a “top priority” since 2000).
263 Deng, supra note 244, at 349.
264 See id. at 349 n.13 (discussing a statement made by Zhou Xiaochuan, the
chairperson of CSRC in 2000, regarding the importance of “investor protection”).
259
260
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2005.265 Unlike the United States, Canada, and England, China
lacked an effective remedy for oppressed minority shareholders,
and thus a shareholder derivative action could “play a more
important role” in China than in other countries.266 The lack of a
shareholder remedy contributed “to the weak corporate
governance system in China,” especially in protecting minority
shareholders.267
Chinese government officials and commentators also believed
that a shareholder derivative lawsuit would promote better
corporate governance in China.268 Given the role of derivative
lawsuits in the United States and their impact on corporate
governance, there was “almost unanimous understanding” that
China had to institute a shareholder derivative system.269
The statutory shareholder derivative device created by the 2005
Company Law is similar in some respects to the MBCA in the
United States as well as recent statutory enactments in England
and Canada.270 Article 150 of the 2005 Company Law states “a
director, a supervisor, or any senior officer shall be liable for any
losses of the company if he/she violates any provisions of laws, or
administrative regulations, or the articles of [association] of the
company in performance of his/her official duties.”271 While
Article 150 does not state if minority shareholders can sue majority
shareholders, it appears that a controlling shareholder, who
violates the interests of the company and causes losses through this

265 See Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 5–6 (noting the large percentage of
state-owned shares in comparison to the percentage of tradable shares, especially
with regard to some of China’s biggest companies).
266 See id. at 6 (explaining that China’s lack of a “statutory oppression
remedy” increases the role of derivative action in China).
267 Yu, supra note 249, at 56.
268 See Deng, supra note 244, at 355 (stating that “[i]t is widely believed” that
shareholder derivative lawsuits would provide “for improved corporate
governance generally in China”).
269 Id. See generally Guanghua Yu, Using Western Law to Improve China’s StateOwned Enterprises: Of Takeovers and Securities Fraud, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 339, 340
(2004) (exploring the potential benefits of using Western laws on takeovers and
securities fraud to diminish the inefficiencies related to Chinese SOEs).
270 See Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 1 (describing China’s adoption of the
derivative law as being part of a greater “codification trend”).
271 Id. at 7.
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violation, can be subject to a shareholder derivative lawsuit under
Article 152.272
Article 152 of the 2005 Company Law contains procedural rules
that distinguish between companies limited by shares (public
companies) and closely held companies.273 In order to file a
derivative action, public corporations’ shareholders must own,
alone or jointly, more than 1% of the company’s shares for at least
180 consecutive days before filing an action.274 For a closely held
company, no minimum ownership interests or time constraints are
imposed, presumably because abusive shareholder derivative
actions are considered rare in such firms.275 As in the case of India,
this ownership requirement for public corporations is similar to
those of bond statutes adopted by some U.S. states, although India
does not impose a bond requirement. Even if shareholders meet
the ownership requirements, they face financial disincentives
because China, like the United States, follows the rule that each
party bears its own attorney’s fees.276
Similar to the demand requirement developed in U.S. law,
Article 152 of the 2005 Company Law specifically describes three
circumstances in which shareholders may commence a derivative
lawsuit. First, shareholders demand that a governing body of the
272 See id. (explaining that while Chinese law does not expressly provide for
derivative suits against a controlling shareholder, Article 152 of the 2005
Company Law may nevertheless allow it in certain circumstances).
273 See id. at 8 (“Article 152 distinguishes companies limited by shares (CLS)
from limited liability companies (LLC).”).
274 See id. (listing the specific standing requirements for all shareholders
wishing to sue under Article 152 of the 2005 Company Law).
275 See id. (suggesting that stringent standing requirements may not be
required for closely held limited liability companies because the more public the
company, the greater the need for legislation regarding corporate governance)
(citing Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of
Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1784–85 (2004)).
276 In China, the losing party bears court-determined filing and litigation fees.
Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 9 (citing Supreme People Court’s (SPC) Measures on
the People’s Courts’ Acceptance of Litigation Fees 1989, art. 19). Accord Donald C.
Clarke, The Private Attorney-General in China: Potential and Pitfalls, 8 WASH. U.
GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 241, 253 (2009) (“In China, as in the United States, the general
rule is that parties bear their own attorney’s fees.”); Virginia E. Harper Ho, From
Contracts to Compliance? An Early Look at Implementation Under China’s New Labor
Legislation, 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 35, 101 n.290 (2009) (“China has a general no-feeshifting rule on attorney fees, although court costs are borne either by the losing
party or jointly.”). Cf. Elizabeth Ann Hunt, Note, Made in China: Who Bears the Loss
and Why?, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 915, 920 (2009) (explaining that attorney’s fees
and low damage awards deter many Chinese citizens from filing claims ).
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company brings an action and that body refuses.277 Second, the
governing body “fails to raise a lawsuit within 30 days upon”
receiving the shareholders’ request.278
Third, if urgent
circumstances exist where the failure to implement a legal action
would cause “unrecoverable damages to the interests of the
company.”279 This formulation of the demand requirement clearly
resembles the MBCA provision adopted by many U.S. states.280
In April 2006, the Supreme People’s Court of China issued the
Provisions of Several Issues Concerning the Application of the PRC
Company Law, which is the Court’s initial interpretation of the 2005
Company Law and addresses some of the procedural issues in
shareholder derivative actions.281 In addition to the 2005 Company
Law, the CSRC has issued numerous regulations to improve
corporate governance and increase shareholder rights.282 For
example, the 2002 Corporate Governance Code empowers
shareholders to take legal action when a board or shareholder
meeting violates shareholder rights or violates laws or
administrative regulations.283
See Chinese 2005 Company Law, supra note 261, art. 152 (stating the
specific requirements for bringing a derivative suit in China).
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (2008).
277

No shareholder may commence a derivative proceeding until: (1) a
written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable
action; and (2) 90 days have expired from the date delivery of the
demand was made unless the shareholder has earlier been notified that
the demand has been rejected by the corporation or unless irreparable
injury to the corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of the
90-day period.
Id.
281 See Xiao Huang, supra note 204, at 12–13 (noting that the Supreme People’s
Court announced that this guidance would be introduced in several installments
so forthcoming interpretations may explain additional procedures).
282 For a listing of these guidelines, see id. at 10.

Guidelines for Articles of Association of Listed Companies 1997, General
Requirements of Shareholders’ Meeting of Listed Companies 2000,
Guidelines for Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed
Companies 2001, The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed
Companies 2002, and the Regulations for the Protection of Individual
Shareholders’ Rights 2004.
Id.
283 See id. at 10–11 (citing Zhengjianfa No.1 of 2002 [Code of Corp. Governance for
Listed Cos.] (promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm'n, Jan. 7, 2001,
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Nothing in the 2005 Company Law, however, addresses the
substantive fiduciary duties of directors.284 Thus it remains unclear
what duties directors owe to the company and when they have
violated those duties. One commentator observed that “Chinese
law and regulatory practice remains unclear on the issue of
standards of liability for independent directors, and indeed for
directors in general.”285 Shareholder derivative actions filed under
the 2005 Company Law, however, may flesh out such duties as a
means of further promoting corporate governance reform in
China.286
5. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION FOR INVESTORS IN INDIAN AND CHINESE
CORPORATIONS
As Sections 2 and 3 discussed, both India and China have taken
substantial steps toward establishing free market economies since
the mid-1980s. India has abandoned the Fabian socialism that it
had adopted following its independence from England in 1947.
Similarly, China has moved away from its centrally planned
economy that the Communist Chinese Party implemented after
gaining power in the 1940s. As part of the process of moving
toward free markets, both countries have decreased state control of
corporations by increasing private ownership within existing
corporate structures and by encouraging entrepreneurship. Both
countries have also replaced central government control of their
stock exchanges and developed market oriented mechanisms to
encourage capital formation. More recently, both countries have
moved to recognize shareholder derivative lawsuits. Section 5.1
addresses the rationales for this change and the basis for the
specific derivative device chosen by each country. Section 5.2 then
effective Jan. 7, 2001), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release
/200708/t20070810_69223.htm, art. 4 (China).
284 See Chao Xi, In Search of an Effective Monitoring Board Model: Board Reforms
and the Political Economy of Corporate Law in China, 22 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 22–23
(2007) (suggesting that the 2005 Company Law would be improved by detailing
the substance of the general duties of loyalty and due diligence that directors owe
to the company) (citing Chinese 2005 Company Law, supra note 261, art. 148).
285 Clarke, supra note 226, app. 1 at 224.
286 See Deng, supra note 244, at 355 (supporting the idea that although China
does not follow common law, shareholder derivative lawsuits may “play an
important role in enhancing corporate governance” in China, as judicial decisions
clarify what constitutes “permissible conduct”).
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discusses the potential problems that India will face in
implementing effective shareholder derivative litigation. Section
5.3 discusses the likely implementation problems for shareholder
derivative actions in China.
5.1. The Rationales for Recognizing Shareholder Derivative Lawsuits
Within the evolving global economy, corporations must
compete to raise capital from investors. Many investors want to
invest in foreign corporations and entire investment companies are
devoted to investing in international markets and emerging
markets specifically.287 Indeed, in the ever-increasing global
economy, investors in the developed world are now investing
significant amounts of capital into emerging economies.288 Foreign
institutional investors’ investments in emerging markets have risen
“from $25 billion in 1990 to $300 billion in 2005.”289
Naturally, India and China sought to tap into investors’ desire
to invest in foreign and emerging markets. Both countries have
already taken many steps to attract foreign investors, including
modernization of their corporate legal structures and their stock
exchanges.
The motivating force for now accepting the
shareholder derivative device appears to be a desire to increase
protections for shareholders, especially minority shareholders, as a
means of attracting more foreign capital investments. In addition,
recognizing shareholder derivative lawsuits is a method for
overcoming domestic investors’ skepticism about these countries’

287 See, e.g., INT’L FIN. CORP., FUNDING OPERATIONS 3 (Sept. 2009), available at
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/treasury.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/RoadShowPresenta
tion-Sept2009/$FILE/FUNDING+PRESENTATION+September-2009.pdf.
(showing a presentation of the International Finance Corporation that includes
details on its funding operations and its goal of “catalyzing private sector
investment in developing countries”); see also ISI EMERGING MARKETS,
http://www.securities.com/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2011) (providing data on
emerging international markets).
288 See generally P. Krishna Prasanna, Foreign Institutional Investors: Investment
Preference in India, 3 J. ADMIN. & GOVERNANCE, 40, 41 (2008), available at
http://www.joaag.com/uploads/4_PrasannaFinal3_2_.pdf
(detailing
how
transnational capitalism has led to a significant flow of capital from developed
countries to emerging economies, like in India).
289 Todd Moss et al., Why Doesn’t Africa Get More Equity Investment? Frontier
Stock Markets, Firm Size and Asset Allocation of Global Emerging Market Funds 1 (Ctr.
for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 112, 2007), available at
http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/12773/.
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corporate entities and capital markets, thus increasing domestic
investments within their corporate structures.
As described in Section 3.2, India’s Ministry of Corporate
Affairs has described its proposed shareholder derivative device as
providing protection for minority shareholder rights. Empowering
investors to bring shareholder derivative actions potentially gives
minority shareholders the power to protect themselves. The
provision of India’s new Companies Bill that enables shareholders
to take legal action, however, is not well defined. The provision
does not delineate the causes of action for which derivative actions
may be instituted beyond oppression, mismanagement, and
changes to share rights, as explained in Section 3.2. Further, the
new Companies Bill defines standards of conduct for directors by
stating the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith that are
similar to those defined in U.S. states adopting the MBCA.
However, it does not empower shareholders to file derivative
actions for a breach of those duties nor does it define how those
duties could be breached. Despite the similar definition of
fiduciary duties, India’s proposed new Companies Bill does not
closely resemble the shareholder derivative laws of either the
United States or England.290 The new Companies Bill thus appears
to adopt the shareholder derivative device, but without sufficient
definition to truly enable minority shareholders to protect
themselves. This is but one of many problems that India faces in
implementing shareholder derivative litigation; Section 5.2 will
explain other practical problems of implementation.
China’s 2005 Company Law was expressly adopted to increase
investor protections and thus improve China’s capital markets, as
described in Section 4.2.2. China had a unique concern for
minority shareholders, given the continuing high percentage of
state-owned shares even within private corporations. It also
expressed a belief that empowering shareholders to file derivative
lawsuits on behalf of corporations would improve corporate
governance.
Unlike India, China’s shareholder derivative
provisions resemble the MBCA adopted by many U.S. states, as
well as the recent statutory enactments in England and Canada.
Perhaps this is not surprising since so many lawyers and
bureaucrats in China are trained in the United States and
290 Compare India Companies Bill 2009, supra note 170, with Companies Act,
2006, c. 46, §§ 260–264 (U.K.) (specifying circumstances under which a court will
authorize a derivative claim in England, Wales, or Northern Ireland).
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England.291 Despite China’s decision to adopt statutory provisions
similar to those that have been well tested in the United States,
putting shareholder derivative litigation in practice will prove
extremely difficult within China’s current legal system.
5.2. Problems Implementing Effective Shareholder Litigation in India
While India has adopted many new corporate governance
laws, such as Article 49, that seem to provide strong rights on
paper, India struggles with effective enforcement. “India is not a
country known for vigorous enforcement of legislation. Thus far,
the enforcement of [Article 49] has mirrored the lax enforcement
efforts of other major legislative reforms.”292 While Article 49 went
into effect in 2001, it took six years before the SEBI brought its first
enforcement action293 despite a record of noncompliance with its
provisions.294 The weak enforcement of Article 49 may be
explained by the lack of provisions requiring disclosures and
accountability to shareholders.295 Issues of ineffective enforcement
will likely persist for the new Companies Bill’s shareholder
derivative provisions.
Most countries’ legal systems are rooted in one of four legal
systems: “English common law, French civil law, German civil law
[or] Scandinavian civil law.”296 Researchers utilize two indexes to
compare the laws in these countries: a shareholder rights index

291 See generally David J. Lynch, More of China’s Best, Brightest Return Home,
USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 2003, (Money), at 1B, available at 2003 WLNR 6107628
(reporting on the increased numbers of Chinese students and professionals
returning to China to seek opportunity in China’s new “embrace of marketoriented economic policies”); Reaping Rich Dividends, FIN. EXPRESS, Dec. 16, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 20348532 (comparing successful Chinese efforts to attract
the return of western-educated students and professionals with India’s inability to
combat this ‘brain drain’).
292 Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 388.
293 Id. at 390. While there is weak enforcement overall, the SEBI has brought
enforcement actions. See id. at 390–91 (outlining enforcement proceedings
brought by the SEBI).
294 See Dharmapala & Khanna, supra note 162, at 10 (reporting a lack of
Article 49 enforcement actions even though “compliance with Clause 49 is far
from universal”).
295 See generally Mazumdar, supra note 153, at 254 (concluding that lack of
disclosure and accountability are “major areas of ineffective governance,” which
“diminish investor confidence” and hold back “development of emerging
markets”).
296 Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 8–9.
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that scores countries from zero (low) to six (high), and a rule of law
index that scores countries from zero (low) to ten (high).297 Of the
four systems, English common law countries generally have the
highest scores on the shareholder rights index, indicating that these
countries offer the best protection of shareholder rights.298 India’s
shareholder rights system scores a five, which is equal to that of
other English-origin countries including the United States, the
United Kingdom, Canada, Hong Kong, Pakistan, and South Africa,
and better than forty-two other countries including France,
Germany, Japan, and Switzerland.299
India, however, scores very low on the rule of law index
compared to other countries.300 The Scandinavian-origin countries
had an average score of 10, the German-origin countries 8.68,
English-origin countries 6.46, and French-origin countries 6.05.301
In the rule of law index, advanced countries tend to have high
scores on the index, while developing countries usually have low
scores.302 India has a rule of law score of 4.17, and ranks 41 out of
49 countries studied.303 “Thus, it appears that Indian laws provide
great protection of shareholders’ rights on paper while the
application and enforcement of those laws are lamentable.”304
Enforcement of laws, however, plays a greater role in corporate
governance than simply creating the laws, especially in facilitating
security markets that are not riddled with insider trading scams.305
Like the U.S. legal system, Indian laws accord “a significant
role for the judiciary.”306 India’s courts, however, are incredibly
297 See id. at 9 (describing the indexes used to compare the four primary legal
systems).
298 See id. (reporting that “[t]he English common law countries lead the four
systems in the shareholder rights index with an average score of 4”).
299 Id.; see also Allen et al., supra note 116, at 12 (observing a strong degree of
investor protections in India but finding such protection less effective in practice
due to corruption and inefficiency).
300 Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 9.
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Id. (noting that of the forty-nine countries studied, India received a score
higher than only Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Colombia, Indonesia,
Peru, and the Philippines).
304 Id. at 9–10.
305 See id. at 10–11 (arguing that effective enforcement of shareholder
protection laws is more essential than mere well-designed shareholder protection
laws on the books, which are poorly enforced).
306 Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 359.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss1/4

04 SCARLETT (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

10/30/2011 9:26 PM

INDIA AND CHINA DERIVATIVE ACTIONS

227

slow and backlogged. A 2001 study found that twenty million
cases were awaiting final judgment in India’s courts, including
almost 22,000 in the Supreme Court.307 The results of this backlog
are devastating for shareholders seeking a remedy. A 2004 World
Bank report noted that it is common to wait six years for a first
hearing and twenty years for a final judgment.308 When India
enacted the Companies (Second Amendment) Act in 2002, it
created the National Company Law Tribunal and the National
Company Law Appellate Tribunal to enforce the Companies Act
and other related matters such as “dismantling unprofitable
companies.”309 While these courts were promising steps toward
better enforcement, a recent study shows that these courts’ powers
are rarely utilized.310
Indian businesses have also shown a lack of faith in the legal
system. In a 2005 survey, 50% of firms surveyed said they do not
have a regular legal advisor and “of the half that does, less than
[fifty percent] . . . have ‘legal advisors’ with a law degree or a
license to practice law.”311 The majority of business leaders lacking
a legal advisor reasoned that they did not need one because they
trust their business partners.312 “Clearly, the formal legal system
takes a back seat while reputation, trust and informal personal
relationships are the driving factors in screening counter-parties to
do business with.”313
307 See Varun Bhat, Corporate Governance in India: Past, Present, and Suggestions
for the Future, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1429, 1448–49 (2007) (citing statistics from a 2001
study reporting on India’s judicial backlog).
308 WORLD BANK & INT’L MONETARY FUND, REPORT ON THE OBSERVANCE OF
STANDARDS AND CODES (ROSC): CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNTRY ASSESSMENT:
INDIA 6 (2004), available at http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg_ind.pdf. The
report noted some satisfactory aspects of India’s corporate-governance
framework, including basic rights of shareholders, disclosures, and transparency.
Id. at 2–14 (evaluating India’s compliance with Organization for Economic CoOperation and Development corporate governance principals).
309 Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 360–361 (explaining that the Nat’l
Company Law Tribunal inherited most of its powers from its predecessor the
Company Law Board and consolidated some additional powers previously
enforced by various government bodies) (citing the Companies (Second
Amendment) Act, 2002, No. 11, Acts of Parliament, 2003).
310 Id. at 361.
311 Allen et al., supra note 116, at 23–24.
312 Id. at 24 (“When pressed for a reason, 63% of respondents who did not
have legal advisors claimed they did not need lawyers as they knew all their
business partners and could deal with them fairly.”).
313 Id.
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In post-independence India, unlike most developed countries
and typical of emerging economies, company ownership is highly
concentrated in the hands of family business groups.314 A 2006
study found that almost 60% of India’s largest 500 companies were
affiliated with family business groups, and an additional 11% were
owned, either in whole or in significant part, by the federal or state
governments.315 In other large companies, promoters played a key
and persuasive role in corporate finance because, after
liberalization, many promoters owned half or more than half of the
company.316 In 2002, “the average shareholding of promoters in all
Indian companies was as high as 48.1%.”317
Dominant
shareholders in India, such as promoters, seriously threaten
effective corporate governance because directors become company
insiders.318
In addition, smaller companies rarely rely on the legal system
and “exhibit symptoms of a low investor protection regime (e.g.
ownership concentration, dividend ratio, and valuation) more than
the large firms.”319 These companies often do not seek formal
financing sources, but rather rely on alternative funding sources

314 See Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 362–63 (explaining that family
ownership is a “mainstay” of India’s corporate environment and a primary reason
for a lack of disclosure and governance requirements under the Companies Act).
315 See Rajesh Chakrabarti et al., Corporate Governance in India, 20 J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 59, 59 (2008) (exploring governance challenges resulting from this
concentrated ownership).
316 See Afsharipour, supra note 103, at 363–64 (observing a shift during the
1990s where promoters began to increase their stakes in companies under their
control); see also K.S. Chalapati Rao & Atulan Guha, Ownership Pattern of the Indian
Corporate Sector: Implications for Corporate Governance 1, 11 (Inst. for Stud. in Indus.
Dev.,
Working
Paper
No.
2006/09,
2006),
available
at
http://isidev.nic.in/pdf/wp0609.pdf (stating that promoters own nearly half of
total market capitalization).
317 Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 11–12.

It is believed that this is a result of the ineffectiveness of the legal system
in protecting property rights. Concentrated ownership and family
control are important in countries where legal protection of property
rights is relatively weak. Weak property rights are also behind the
prevalence of family-owned businesses – organization forms that reduce
transaction costs and asymmetric information problems.
Id.
Mohanty, supra note 157, at 234.
Franklin Allen et al., The Financial Systems Capacity in China and India 4
(Nov. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.icrier.org/pdf
/6dec07/Paper_%20Rajesh%20Chakrabarti_Session1.pdf.
318
319
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such as friends, family, business partners, and informal trade
creditors.320 Only 26% of funds are obtained from formal sources,
which reduce the need for companies and creditors to rely on legal
remedies.321
Another significant concern is corruption, which riddles India’s
legal system in general, and the enforcement of corporate laws in
particular.322 For example, there is rampant tax evasion and a
significant shadow economy, which accounts for about 23% of
India’s GDP.323 While India may have weak enforcement of its
laws, it does punish under-performing CEOs because, “CEOs are
more likely to lose their jobs when corporate performance is
poorer.”324
Until India more consistently implements its laws through
judicial enforcement, the shareholder litigation rights created in the
new Companies Bill will likely prove ineffective. If India’s judicial
system cannot more expeditiously render judgments, then
shareholders will simply choose not to seek a remedy through the
courts. Similarly, if shareholders believe India’s judicial system is
corrupt, they will not seek judicial remedies. Although India is
seeking to implement shareholder litigation rights to increase
investor confidence in India’s companies, its judicial system may
undermine that effort. Consequently, domestic and foreign
investment in Indian companies may not reach the levels India
seeks until judicial reform occurs.
5.3. Problems Implementing Effective Shareholder Litigation in China
One issue with passing sweeping national corporate
governance reform is that the CSRC regulatory power “has
trespassed into the traditional territories of both the Company Law
and Securities Law. This is particularly true in the area of
corporate governance.”325 Consequently, the division between the
supervisory powers of the CSRC and the authority of the stock
Id.
Id. at 5.
322 See Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 15 (discussing the rise of continued
widespread corruption in the Indian corporate sector since the 1950s).
323 Allen et al., supra note 116, at 8.
324 Chakrabarti, supra note 104, at 13.
325 Wei, supra note 200, at 494 (“For instance, because the Company Law does
not provide detailed provisions on corporate governance, the CSRC has
endeavored to fill this gap.”).
320
321
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exchanges is unclear, leading to confusion in regulation of
companies and securities markets.326 Uncertainty in the law leads
to confusion over corporate governance rules. For example, it is
unclear what duties directors owe to the company. “Chinese law
and regulatory practice remains unclear on the issue of standards
of liability for independent directors, and indeed for directors in
general.”327 In addition, “the lack of detailed procedures for
shareholder actions and civil remedies may lead to enforcement
difficulties.”328 Shareholder derivative lawsuits, however, may
serve as one way to promote corporate governance reform in
China if the law can be sufficiently clarified to allow effective
enforcement.329 While China is not a common law country judicial
decisions in shareholder derivative lawsuits can “clarify the scope
of permissible conduct, and that may . . . be generalized by the
CSRC, the [Supreme People’s Court], or other Chinese
authorities.”330
5.3.1. A Struggling Legal System
No matter the period of rule in China, policy has been
emphasized over law. During the Maoist period, the government
believed that laws were too rigid and would hamper the
revolution.331 Policy ruled the country, and legislation only served
as “a rubber stamp” upon government policy.332 During the
Maoist period, the State directed judges “to decide cases according
to policy goals rather than legal principles.”333

326 See id. at 503 (describing that while China theoretically has a system of
both government supervision and self-regulation, in practice government
supervision is paramount and stock exchange self-regulation is marginal); see also
Shi, supra note 200, at 477–79 (explaining the CSRC’s pervasive regulatory
presence over Chinese stock exchanges which has “constrained [the stock
exchanges’] independent operation”).
327 Clarke, supra note 226, at 224 app. 1.
328 Shi, supra note 200, at 485.
329 See Deng, supra note 244, at 355 (indicating that a well-instituted
shareholder litigation system would improve governance in China).
330 Id.
331 See Layton, supra note 205, at 1959 (noting Mao Zedong's view of the law
as rigid) (citing Stanley Lubman, Looking for Law in China, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1,
29 (2006)).
332 Id.
333 Id.
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Modern China continues to have little judicial independence
because the judiciary is “parallel to, rather than superior to, other
units of the Chinese bureaucracy.”334 Not only are courts financed
by the level of government that created them, but they are also
“administratively and institutionally accountable”335 to the
government.336 For example, the Chinese Communist Party
supervises judges performing government administrative
functions such as tax collection.337 In addition, many judges in the
provinces “are not legally trained.”338 This lack of independence as
well as reliance on policy over law engenders a biased judiciary
that often favors local defendants.339 The Chinese Communist
Party has announced that it will elevate the prominence of its laws,
but this elevation will only occur “vis-à-vis policy.”340 However,
most laws and regulations continue to be an embodiment of
Chinese Communist Party policy.341
Thus, whether the
shareholder derivative provisions of the 2005 Company Law will
improve corporate governance and truly permit shareholders to

Id. at 1957–58.
Id. at 1958 (quoting Randall Peerenboom, Judicial Independence and Judicial
Accountability: An Empirical Study of Individual Case Supervision, 55 CHINA J. 67, 71
(2006).
336 See id. (“[Courts] are subject to supervision from [China Communist Party]
organizations and procuratorates, have limited adjudicative authority, are
charged with other responsibilities such as tax collection, and primarily employ
judges who are not legally trained.”).
337 Donald C. Clarke, Empirical Research into the Chinese Judicial System, in
BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL AFPPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 164,
174–75 (Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003) ( stating that “local
governments often enlist judges in the work of birth control, tax collecting, urban
beautification, and the physical expulsion of beggars”).
338 Layton, supra note 205, at 1958. The “percentage of judges with ‘proper
L.L.B. degrees’ is estimated at less than ten percent and applicants for judgeships
were not required to take national bar examination until 2002.” Id. n.73 (citing
Stanley Lubman, Looking for Law in China, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 29 (2006).
339 See id. (describing conditions which pressure Chinese “judges to favor
local defendants in court proceedings”)
340 Id. at 1959. In 1996, the president of China formally adopted a policy of
ruling China in accordance with the rule of law. Id. n.83
341 Id. at 1959–60 (“Policies still trump laws, as exemplified by the [Chinese
Communist Party]’s extralegal interference with ‘day-to-day governance,’ the use
of internal [Chinese Communist Party] rules instead of judicial sanctions to
punish party members for legal violations, and judges’ use of ‘ideological
discretion’ when deciding cases.” (internal citations omitted)).
334
335
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recover for mismanagement remains uncertain due to the doubtful
ability of Chinese courts to enforce the new law.342
Not only do Chinese courts struggle to remain independent,
they also struggle to enforce judgments in civil actions. “[U]p to
fifty percent of civil judgments [in China] go unenforced].”343
Judgments go unenforced because courts lack sufficient personnel
and judges—who are selected and paid by local governments—
often refuse to enforce actions against powerful local parties.344
Additionally, other government agencies have proven unwilling to
assist courts in enforcing civil judgments.345
To the extent China’s judicial system hampers effective
implementation of shareholder derivative lawsuits, other
alternatives may be needed. Public enforcement measures might
be preferable to lawsuits since “[China] has traditionally placed
greater emphasis on [its public enforcement] laws to maintain
‘control and discipline.’”346 Similarly, China may consider utilizing
private enforcement mechanisms rather than relying solely upon
shareholder derivative lawsuits. Parties in China often use
mediation (a private dispute resolution mechanism) because it is
endorsed by the government and is less expensive than civil
lawsuits.347
In addition to judicial problems, shareholders will likely face
difficulty in finding adequate representation to file shareholder
derivative actions. China lacks a sufficient number of legally
trained professionals to act as lawyers and judges.348 Lawyers
represent clients in only about 10 to 25% of civil cases and only
about 4% of Chinese business entities retain regular legal

342 See Shi, supra note 200, at 452 (“But it remains to be seen whether
improved legislation will change practices, as law enforcement has been a longstanding concern in China.”); id. at 484–85 (“Clearly, poor legal enforcement has
been a problem for China.”).
343 Layton, supra note 205, at 1958–59.
344 See id. at 1959 (explaining why many judgments are not enforced in
China).
345 See id. at 1959 (using the example of state-owned banks refusing or
delaying requests to freeze accounts).
346 Id. at 1960.
347 Id. (observing that “extrajudicial means, such as mediation continue to
play an important role [in China] due to government encouragement”) (footnote
omitted).
348 Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 43, 64
(2000).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss1/4

04 SCARLETT (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

10/30/2011 9:26 PM

INDIA AND CHINA DERIVATIVE ACTIONS

233

advisors.349 Moreover, even if a shareholder obtained a lawyer, a
Chinese lawyer might hesitate to even file a shareholder derivative
action. China’s Ministry of Justice “has authority over lawyers and
bar associations and controls their professional licenses through a
system of annual renewal.”350 By denying re-registration to an
attorney, the judicial authorities avoid the procedures required for
formal suspension or withdrawal. Therefore, because lawyers’
licenses to practice law must be registered annually, lawyers may
avoid accepting cases that challenge the government in some way.
Such cases may include actions against SOEs or actions against
private Chinese corporations if the government is a significant
shareholder. Even filing cases can be difficult for lawyers, because
courts have much discretion in accepting cases and often apply
both political and legal criteria to determine whether to accept
cases.351 This may further dissuade attorneys from prosecuting
shareholder derivative actions as permitted by the 2005 Company
Law.
5.3.2. Unclear and Problematic Procedures
China’s legal system generally is criticized as “a bewildering
and inconsistent array of laws, regulations, provisions, measures,
directives, notices, decisions, explanations, and so forth, all
claiming to be normatively binding.”352 It thus is not surprising
that commentators have been quick to criticize the procedures
outlined in Article 152 of the 2005 Company Law.353 One critic has
noted that the 2005 Company Law may face enforcement problems
because it “does not spell out the procedures for taking such an
action, nor does it elaborate on the types of remedies available to
shareholders apart from compensation.”354 In addition, Professor
Huang has argued that the 2005 Law poses standing issues since
only current shareholders are allowed to file lawsuits.355 Unlike
Id.
China: Rights Lawyers Face Disbarment Threats, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
(May 30, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/05/28/china-rights-lawyersface-disbarment-threats.
351 Id.
352 Orts, supra note 348, at 68.
353 See Huang, supra note 230, at 242–49 (providing detailed criticism of the
procedures in Article 152 and suggesting potential reforms).
354 Shi, supra note 200, at 495.
355 Huang, supra note 230, at 242 (arguing that China’s approach to standing
in derivative lawsuits is both under-inclusive and over-inclusive).
349
350
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shareholder lawsuits in Australia and Canada, former shareholders
may not bring lawsuits.356 However, only current shareholders are
allowed to file shareholder derivative lawsuits in U.S. state and
federal courts.
The 2005 Company Law also does not specify a statute of
limitations. By applying the 1986 General Principles of the Civil
Law, however, the applicable statute of limitations is likely two
years from when the company knew or should have known that its
rights were infringed.357 Since it is the company’s knowledge
rather than the shareholders’ knowledge, that triggers the statute
of limitations, the current law may prove unfair to shareholders.358
Company officials with knowledge of the infringement may
simply allow the statute of limitations to lapse without taking
actions because they could be defendants in a derivative lawsuit.359
In addition, shareholder derivative litigation costs have also
dissuaded shareholders in China from filing lawsuits. Litigation
costs in China include filing fees, attorneys’ fees, and sometimes
“[c]ertain under-the-table sweeteners.”360
Article 19 of the
Supreme People Court’s Measures on the People’s Courts’
Acceptance of Litigation Fees, written in 1989, requires the losing
party to pay filing fees and litigation costs, but each party still pays
its own attorneys’ fees.361 This measure could be applied to
shareholder derivative lawsuits, because the 2005 Company Law
does not dictate how attorneys’ fees and litigation costs are to be
paid and clearly does not provide financial incentives for
shareholders to bring shareholder derivative lawsuits.362 However,
the matter is uncertain. Given China’s high turnover rate for
investments, a rational investor in a Chinese corporation may
prefer to simply sell his shares rather than litigate in the absence of
such financial incentives.363

356 See id. at 242–43 (comparing China’s standing procedures in derivative
lawsuits to those of Australia and Canada).
357 Huang, supra note 204, at 9–10.
358 See id. at 10 (noting that minority shareholders may be prejudiced because
they are not often “immediately aware of the harm done to the company”).
359 Id.
360 Id. at 9 n.42.
361 Id. at 9.
362 Id. at 16.
363 Id. at 13 (noting that litigation costs will detract most rational shareholders
from bringing derivative lawsuits rather than simply selling their shares).
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The likelihood and effectiveness of shareholder derivative
lawsuits could increase if China amends the 2005 Company Law in
key ways. For instance, shareholders would be more willing to
bring derivative lawsuits if an indemnity provision safeguarded
losing shareholders against paying litigation costs and the
corporation’s attorneys’ fees where such lawsuits were brought “in
good faith and in the best interest of the company.”364 Other
commentators have offered suggestions for funding Chinese
derivative lawsuits based on financing mechanisms in other
countries.365 To facilitate shareholder derivative lawsuits, courts
could also provide shareholders early access to the company’s
documents rather than requiring them to wait for the documents
until during discovery or at trial.366 Shareholders in the United
States, for instance, typically possess a right to inspect the
company’s records.367 In addition, the 2005 Company Law lacks
any settlement provision. Typically, settlements are not subject to
court supervision in China, which increases the chances of
frivolous lawsuits.368 To prevent this yet permit meritorious
shareholder derivative lawsuits, China’s courts should monitor
settlements.369
6.

CONCLUSION

Shareholder derivative litigation has been recognized for
hundreds of years within the United States. Most states have
adopted statutory provisions explicitly empowering shareholders
to file derivative actions on behalf of corporations and defining
directors’ fiduciary duties. Despite much criticism, shareholder

Id. at 15.
See Zhong Zhang, Making Shareholder Derivative Actions Happen in China:
How Should Lawsuits be Funded?, 38 H.K. L.J. 523, 530–37 (2008) (analogizing the
several Western approaches to funding shareholder derivative lawsuits as
providing potential guidance for funding derivative lawsuits in China).
366 See Huang, supra note 204, at 17 (suggesting that shareholders’ “pre-trial
access” to company documents may serve as a beneficial reform to China’s
derivative lawsuit system).
367 See id. at 17 n.74 (discussing the shareholder demand for inspection of
records provision under Delaware law).
368 See id. at 10 (noting that Chinese courts are not required to approve
settlements and further explaining why “settlement[s] without a court’s
supervision may cause frivolous lawsuits”).
369 See id. (recommending that Chinese courts should “play an active role in
approving settlements of derivative lawsuits”).
364
365
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derivative actions are frequently litigated in the United States and
thus continue to play an important role in corporate governance.
Criticism of shareholder derivative litigation in the United States
has not deterred either India or China from recognizing
shareholder derivative litigation. China has adopted statutory
provisions that closely resemble the MBCA, which has been
enacted by a majority of U.S. states. India has proposed a statutory
provision that also recognizes derivative actions, although only its
formulation of directors’ fiduciary duties bears any resemblance to
United States law.
India and China are both focused on developing a free market
system of private investment in corporate entities. Both countries
have recognized derivative actions for the purpose of increasing
investor protections and, in turn, for increasing investors’
willingness to invest in their corporations. To some extent, both
countries may anticipate that statutory provisions for shareholder
derivative actions may improve corporate governance, either as a
preventative measure to deter bad conduct by managers or to
remedy injuries suffered by corporations from such conduct. Thus,
China and India’s pursuit of a free market system has motivated
them to empower shareholders to file derivative actions on behalf
of corporations.
Shareholder derivative litigation in India and China, however,
faces significant challenges that may suggest the likelihood and
effectiveness of such litigation is marginal in the near future. India
will need to clarify the causes of action on which shareholders may
file derivative actions and also clarify for the procedures for doing
so. India’s legal system will also need to provide more prompt
adjudications for shareholder derivative litigation to be useful in
holding directors accountable or improving future decisionmaking by directors. China also will need to improve its judicial
system. Both countries will need to develop explicit procedures to
guide shareholder derivative litigation and perhaps to encourage
shareholders to bring such lawsuits. Similarly, both countries also
must develop their definitions of fiduciary duties for shareholder
derivative litigation to be effective and also to guide directors’
conduct.
This comparative analysis offers insights for investors and
corporations in the United States, as well as for the states. First,
investors should recognize that the shareholder derivative devices
as expressed by India and China does not offer the same
protections as it does in the United States, particularly given their
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existing legal systems. Although the recognition of derivative
litigation by India and China is appealing for symbolic reasons, it
provides only false comfort because their current legal systems are
unable to resolve the internal corporate disputes presented by such
litigation. Until substantial judicial reform occurs, the simple
message is buyer beware.
Corporations that adopt arbitration provisions to eliminate
investors’ ability to file shareholder derivative litigation may place
themselves at a competitive disadvantage. To the extent that
corporations feel shareholder derivative litigation is broken, then
corporations should work with investors to improve the current
system. As recent developments in India and China demonstrate,
such efforts will likely influence other countries, especially in light
of efforts to harmonize corporate governance standards within the
global economy.
Finally, this Article offers a broader message on the direction
that the United States should be moving within the global
economy. Two of the largest and fastest growing markets in the
world, India and China, have been decisively moving toward free
market systems and away from their prior socialist and communist
systems, respectively. Both countries have been disentangling
government from business enterprises, reducing regulations,
minimizing government interventions in the markets, and seeking
methods for better protecting investors’ interests. The changes that
they have implemented toward free market systems have proven
tremendously successful. To the extent that the United States is
edging away from its free market system through recent bailouts
and extensive new regulations, it is moving in the wrong direction
and is out of step with the global economy. The United States
must carefully consider the likely consequences of intervening in
private corporations and the capital markets. The United States’
ability to effectively compete for capital in the global economy
likely depends on its continued support of the free market
principles that are being so widely adopted by other countries.
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